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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three essays in economic theory, two on search models with
information acquisition and one on repeated games when precise information about
discount factors is unavailable.
In the first essay, I develop a model in which optimal costly information acquisition
by individual firms causes adverse selection in the market as a whole. Each firm’s
information acquisition policy determines which customers it serves, which in turn
affects the distribution of remaining customers and hence other firms’ incentives. I
show that when information acquisition is ‘smooth’, the adverse selection externality
due to each firm is dampened, and in equilibrium all firms make positive profits.
By contrast, with lumpy information acquisition, only a limited number of firms are
profitable. I establish that my results apply to a broad class of continuous-time
information acquisition processes.
The second essay explores information acquisition in labor markets. Noting that
v
African-Americans face shorter employment durations than similar whites, we hy-
pothesize that employers discriminate in acquiring ability-relevant information. We
construct a model with a binary information generating process, ‘monitoring’, at the
disposal of firms. Monitoring black but not white workers is self-sustaining. This
‘bad’ equilibrium is not merely a matter of coordination; rather, it is determined by
history and not easily reversed. The model’s additional predictions, lower lifetime
incomes and longer unemployment durations for blacks, are both strongly empirically
supported.
In the third essay, we investigate the possibility of repeated games equilibria that
are robust to the discount factors. We prove a negative result which shows that a
sizable part of the set of feasible individually rational payoffs can never be produced by
such equilibria. We find the cutoff defining this region and interpret it as a limit on the
ability to punish deviations when future rewards for randomization cannot be finely
calibrated. Furthermore, we present a robust folk theorem to support payoffs in the
complementary region with strategies that remain Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
at all greater discount factors.
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1Chapter 1
Search, Information Acquisition
and Adverse Selection
1.1 Introduction
Consider a venture capitalist inspecting a start-up soliciting an investment. Should
she invest in the start-up, she will get a payoff that depends on its profitability.
Ideally, she invests if the return on investment clears some benchmark. However,
start-ups vary in type, and this variation is not immediately observable to the venture
capitalist. She may aid her decision by using an information acquisition technology
to learn about the start-up’s expected profitability, at a cost. The venture capitalist
must, naturally, keep in mind the prior distribution over start-up types before deciding
whether and how to use this technology.
However, she must also consider that she may not be the first potential investor
solicited. Could the start-up have been rejected for investment by other venture cap-
italists? What would those other venture capitalists have learned about the start-up,
and how would this information influence rejections? The answers to these questions
affect the venture capitalist’s beliefs about the start-up, and therefore the way the
technology will be used. There are clearly spill-over effects in information acquisition
2decisions. However, an intriguing possibility arises: could it be that the induced up-
date on beliefs by others’ decisions is so pessimistic that the start-up is immediately
rejected, without consideration? The answer to this question will turn on the nature
of the information acquisition technology.
I develop a framework that allows exploration of the link between information
acquisition technology and the limitations it imposes on the number of its users
- the ‘market size’. The framework is simple yet flexible, with the emphasis on
allowing for variation of the information acquisition technology. I obtain precise
market size predictions in the two most natural instances of the model, which are
then augmented with a generalization to a large class of continuous-time information
acquisition processes.
This paper studies a model of sequential search with asymmetric information
regarding the value of transacting. A ‘firm’, faced with uncertainty, may choose
whether, and possibly additionally what, to learn (at a cost) about the ‘applicant’
before deciding to accept or reject her. Each firm will choose what to learn optimally,
given other firms’ behavior.
Each firm does not know, when visited, if the applicant has visited other firms. As
the applicant leaves the market when accepted and the same information acquisition
technology is available to every firm, in equilibrium there is a form of adverse selection
in the unmatched that is directly related to the technology’s characteristics. There-
fore, learning is interactive not because a firm is directly affected by its opponents’
actions, but rather because these actions determine the level of adverse selection in the
market. This endogenous adverse selection in turn affects what information the firm
must acquire to protect itself. I study how the information acquisition technology,
through this channel, will affect equilibrium payoffs.
An applicant sequentially visits firms until either she is accepted, or she has vis-
3ited every one of the finitely many firms. The applicant is characterized by one of
finitely many types, the value common to all firms of a transaction with her. A firm,
upon being visited, may choose to acquire a signal whose distribution varies with the
applicant’s type, bearing a cost that depends on the signal’s informativeness. The
choice set of such signals is a parameter of interest I will vary, but is common to
all firms. Conditional on the applicant’s type, signals acquired by different firms are
independent. Once the cost is paid and the signal observed, the firm may reject the
applicant, getting no further payoff, or accept her, getting a payoff based on her type.
An accepted applicant exits the model.
If the information acquisition technology is smooth, it allows the firm to decide
what to learn about the applicant flexibly. On the other hand, if the technology is
lumpy, it allows a firm to either become fully informed or stay uninformed (or either
with some probability, via mixing).
The main insight in this paper is that when firms possess a lumpy technology, the
adverse selection externality they collectively impose on one another grows with the
number of firms; whereas if firms use a smooth technology, they adjust to increased
competition in a way that reduces their individual externalities, keeping adverse se-
lection in check. As a result, with restricted information acquisition only a limited
number of firms can attain a strictly positive payoff, but with flexible information
acquisition all firms will be strictly profitable. Therefore, the number of firms in a
market is affected by the available information acquisition technology.
The intuition for these results lies in the distribution of types rejected by each
firm. When the technology is smooth, the marginal cost of additional information
acquired about rejected applicants is equal to the marginal benefit. When a firm
is uncertain whether a visiting applicant has been rejected at another firm or not,
its beliefs about her are therefore at least a bit better than about the rejected; it
4is therefore beneficial to acquire at least some information. This will in equilibrium
imply strictly positive profits. When the technology is lumpy, with enough firms,
beliefs about rejected applicants are not marginal but rather excessively bad, so that
the number of firms that can profitably become informed is limited.
If the cost of the fully informative signal was fixed, one would be concerned that
the result is driven by the fact that, as adverse selection grows worse with the number
of firms, the information provided by the signal is diminishing but the cost is not.
To avoid this trap, I allow the cost of the signal to depend continuously on the
informational content, which in turn depends on the prior. With information costs
based on Shannon’s mutual information, firms only ‘pay for what they get’ - as the
ex-ante uncertainty goes to zero, so does the signal cost.1 The result is also not driven
by discontinuity in the lumpy case either, as mixing allows a firm to produce a signal
with any probability of being fully informative. The ‘lumpiness’ of the information
comes not from an all-or-nothing choice of signal, then, but rather from the extreme
nature of the informed posteriors.
In a sense, flexible learning, combined with continuous costs based on mutual
information, ‘dampens’ adverse selection. The marginality of a rejected applicant
ensures that the updating on being visited is not as pessimistic as in the lumpy
case. As the number of firms expands in the smooth learning model, they each learn
less, effectively always leaving surplus for the rest. However, the main results are
not dependent on the mutual information cost function, and a generalization of the
‘smooth’ case to a very broad setting is considered in section 1.5.
The model in this paper can apply to a variety of contexts. Other than investment
in start-ups, applications include hiring in labor markets with non-negotiable (e.g.
minimum) wages, insurance markets, and even human mating. It can be used, for
1This is going to require a somewhat non-standard formulation of the game, as beliefs do not
typically enter payoffs directly.
5instance, to think about the effects of the prohibition of health insurance rejections
in the Affordable Care Act. While one may think the prevention of screening by
insurers would cause adverse selection, the results in this paper show that screening
creates a different, potentially worse, kind of adverse selection. The model does not
address price-setting, but it can accommodate pricing based on variable observable
flow outside options - as long as it is not determined after information acquisition.
One can show the paper’s main results continue to hold, mutatis mutandis, even when
market size affects such prices.
The present paper builds heavily on work on search with adverse selection. In-
derst (2005) introduces a search model where contracts are used to separate types in
equilibrium. Lauermann and Wolinsky’s (2016) search model determines the level of
information aggregation when exogenous, conditionally i.i.d. signals of a buyer’s type
are available to sellers. Zhu (2012) uses a decentralized search market with a similar
signaling technology to model exploding offers in over-the-counter markets. These
last two models strongly develop the intuition for the solicitation effect, the fact that
being visited at all can be a negative signal, as it speaks of possible rejection from
other potential transactions. However, the information acquisition process is taken
to be both free and exogenous, with the focus being on prices.
The model in this paper has certain parallels with common values auctions, in
particular in the existence of a probabilistic version of the Winner’s Curse; in equilib-
rium, an accepted applicant will have had worse signal realizations at all firms visited
previously. Persico (2000) examines optimal information acquisition in auctions, find-
ing that different auction procedures induce different levels of information acquisition.
Bergemann, Shi and Va¨lima¨ki (2009) study auctions with interdependent values and
a binary information choice. In that context they model the number of bidders who
choose to become informed much in the same spirit as this paper addresses market
6size.
Finally, the present model is heavily influenced by the literature on rational inat-
tention. The model uses as a measure of informativeness mutual information, built
on Shannon (1948)’s notion of entropy, used in economics as a cost of information
measure since Sims (2003). Strategic interaction with rational inattention has been
studied by both Yang (2015) and Denti (2016) in the context of coordination games.
Gentzkow and Kamenica (2014) write a model in which the informed party must pay
to disclose information, rather than to acquire it. Ravid (2016) examines rational
inattention in a bargaining model with one-sided offers. Additionally, Mateˇjka and
McKay (2015) study discrete choices with rational inattention, and special attention
is paid to binary choice by Woodford (2008).
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the main model.
Section 1.3 contains existence theorems for the model’s main cases, while section 1.4
provides the main market size results. Section 1.5 generalizes the main results to a
broad class of settings with continuous-time learning, and section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Model
There exist N identical firms and a single applicant. The applicant is characterized
by a private type, θ, which is distributed according to prior p0(·) with full support
on finite, non-singleton Θ ⊂ R \ {0}. θ is the net benefit to a firm of accepting the
applicant. Crucially, I assume min Θ < 0 < max Θ; firms want to accept some, but
not all, applicants.
1.2.1 Timing
Nature chooses the type θ of the applicant according to p0, and a visit order σ from
the set of permutations of the N firms equiprobably. Then, the game proceeds in up
7to N stages, starting with stage 1.
In stage n, firm σ−1(n) is visited. The visited firm may then choose to acquire
information about θ using the available technology. Once information is acquired,
the firm may choose to accept or reject the applicant. If the applicant is accepted or
n = N , the game ends. If the applicant is rejected and n < N , stage n+ 1 follows.
That is, the applicant visits firms in a (uniform) random order, until either he is
accepted, or he has been rejected by every firm. When the applicant visits a firm,
the firm sees only that an applicant has arrived, not her history, the visit order or
(equivalently) the date.
1.2.2 Beliefs
Each firm acts at a single information set. That is to say, firms are not aware of
the applicant’s history of visiting other firms. As a history with rejections is bad
information for the applicant, the applicant would not disclose her history even if the
model were augmented with a cheap-talk stage.
In equilibrium, each firm n has beliefs over the nodes in its information set whose
marginal over θ is not, in general, p0(·) but rather the equilibrim belief pn. The
equilibrium belief is computable from the prior, the applicant’s random visit path,
and the equilibrium acceptance probability of each type of applicant at each rival firm
via Bayes’ rule. These distributions are endogenous variables of the model, as they
are produced by firms’ strategies.
1.2.3 Information Acquisition
When the applicant visits a firm, that firm can then acquire information about the
applicant’s type. A signal structure is a set of conditional distributions {g(·|θ)}θ∈Θ
8for a signal s ∈ S, where S is a finite alphabet.2 A collection of signal structures
G = {{gi(·|θ)}θ∈Θ}i∈I = {gi(·|·)}i∈I is called an information menu. Signal structures
will vary in cost, so a more informative signal will not always be preferable.
I consider two different information menus. The first is the unrestricted informa-
tion menu, GU = (∆S)Θ. As it is comprised of all conditional distributions for the
signal, it is the largest possible set of signal structures. The second is the restricted in-
formation menu, GR = {gno, gall}, comprised of gno with gno(s|θ) = g(s), a completely
uninformative signal structure, and the completely informative signal structure gall,
with gall(s|θ) = δθ, so that the signal is always the same as the applicant’s type.
1.2.4 Strategies
A single-structure strategy for firm n is a pair (g, a) where
• g ∈ G is a signal structure; and
• a : S → [0, 1] maps the signal to a probability of accepting the applicant.
The information menu G is common to all firms. As the firm’s problem may have
multiple solutions, the firm may pursue a strategy that mixes over signal structures.
As the posterior distribution of types conditional on a signal realization will depend on
the signal structure that produced the signal in question, the conditional acceptance
probability must be free to vary with the chosen signal structure. Therefore the set of
mixed strategies is defined as the set of distributions over single-structure strategies,
∆(G × [0, 1]S), rather than ∆G ×∆([0, 1]S).
2In general, a signal alphabet of cardinality equal to that of the set of resulting actions is sufficient
in unrestricted models of rational inattention. I assume |S| ≥ |Θ|.
91.2.5 Mutual Information
Shannon (1948) lays out a particular measure of uncertainty blind to economic conse-
quences. For an arbitrary distribution P with finite support X, the Shannon entropy
is defined as
H(P ) ≡ −
∑
x∈X
P (x) lnP (x) (1.1)
and can be interpreted, if − lnP (x) is thought of as the surprisal3 in observing the
realization x, as the average surprisal in P .4
If a signal distributed by g(·|·) provides a lot of information about θ, it reduces
the uncertainty about θ by on average concentrating its posterior distribution pn(·|·).
Our measure of the informativeness of a signal structure is the expected reduction in
the average surprisal achieved by updating the equilibrium belief pn using the signal.
This expected reduction in the entropy of pn by observing a draw from g is known as
the mutual information between pn and g and is computed as
M(pn, g) = H(pn)− Es[H(pn(·|s))] (1.2)
where the expectation is taken according to g.
Alternatively, mutual information can be defined as the expected Kullback-Leibler
divergence between the prior and the posterior distributions of θ:
M(pn, g) =
∑
s∈S
(∑
θ∈Θ
pn(θ)g(s|θ)
)
DKL(pn(·|s)||pn(·)). (1.3)
This defines mutual information in terms of the extent to which it will in expectation
3The notion of surprisal originates in the information theory literature. Intuitively, observing an
ex-ante unlikely event conveys more information than observing one initially thought to be likely.
The log functional form (uniquely) allows additivity over intersections of independent events as
ln(P (A ∩B)) = ln(P (A) · P (B)) = lnP (A) + lnP (B).
4For this and all other purposes, this paper uses the common convention 0 ln 0 = 0 in accordance
with the limit.
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shift the posterior, where the notion of posterior-shifting is given by the divergence.
Starting with Sims (2003), it is common for work on rational inattention to use mu-
tual information as the cost of information. The main advantages are the treatment of
uncertainty as generic and separable from economic consequences, the agreement with
Blackwell-informativeness, the logit-like discrete choice probabilities as highlighted by
Mateˇka and McKay (2015) and the ability to price all signal structures.
1.2.6 Payoffs
A firm n pays for signal structure g a cost equal to a multiple k of the mutual
information M(·, ·) between its equilibrium belief of the applicant’s type pn and that
of the signal g.5
A firm that accepts an applicant with type θ gains utility θ for doing so, whereas
rejecting any applicant gives a payoff of 0. Therefore, a firm n with beliefs pn about
a new applicant will choose what information to acquire via g and how to respond to
it via the conditional acceptance probability a so as to maximize profits. I normalize
payoffs so that they are ex-post of applicant arrival. Firm n’s payoff, given equilibrium
belief pn and single-structure strategy (g, a) ∈ G × [0, 1]S
a(s)θ − kM(pn, g). (1.4)
As this quantity depends directly on beliefs, the game defined above is a Psycho-
logical Game as described in Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989). In effect,
the requirement that firms only pay for the amount of information they acquire means
that the signal’s cost must depend on how much it shifts the firm’s beliefs from the
equilibrium beliefs.
5 An abstract generalization of the model’s main results to other information acquisition tech-
nologies can be found in section 1.5.
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1.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium for the N -firm model is given by mixed strategies for all firms, with
firm n playing Fn ∈ ∆(G × [0, 1]S), that form a Nash Equilibrium, given that each
firm’s beliefs about arriving applicants follow Bayesian inference.
In equilibrium, each firm n will therefore choose a strategy that solves
max
Fn∈∆(G×[0,1]S)
∫
G×[0,1]S
[∑
θ∈Θ
pn(θ)
∑
s∈S
g(s|θ)a(s)θ − kM(pn, g)
]
dFn(g, a). (1.5)
1.3.1 Inference
Consistency requires firms’ beliefs (pn)n≤N are derived from firms’ strategies (Fn)n≤N
and the prior p0 via Bayes’ Rule. A type θ applicant has a probability
Am(θ) ≡
∫
G×[0,1]S
∑
s∈S
g(s|θ)a(s)dFm(g, a) (1.6)
of being accepted by firm m. The applicant’s visiting sequence is a uniform draw from
the permutations of N , with each permutation getting probability 1/N !. Therefore,
the probability a type θ applicant ever visits firm n is 1/N ! times the sum over these
permutations of the probability that the applicant is rejected at every previously
visited firm:
1
N !
∑
σ∈perm(N)
∏
m:σ(m)<σ(n)
(1− Am(θ)). (1.7)
Thus the posterior probability that an applicant arriving at firm n is of type θ
is the prior p0(θ) times the sum over all visiting sequences of the probability that θ
visits firm n, over the same for all types:
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pn(θ) =
p0(θ)
∑
σ∈perm(N)
∏
m:σ(m)<σ(n)
(1− Am(θ))∑
θ′∈Θ
p0(θ′)
∑
σ∈perm(N)
∏
m:σ(m)<σ(n)
(1− Am(θ′)) . (1.8)
I denote by pˆn : [0, 1]
(N−1)|Θ| → ∆Θ the belief function for firm n taking all other
firms’ acceptance probability vectors (Am)m 6=n into firm n’s posterior distribution for
θ using Bayes’ rule:
pˆn((Am)m 6=n) =
 p0(θ)
∑
σ∈perm(N)
∏
m:σ(m)<σ(n)
(1− Am(θ))∑
θ′∈Θ
p0(θ′)
∑
σ∈perm(N)
∏
m:σ(m)<σ(n)
(1− Am(θ′))

θ∈Θ
. (1.9)
As the expression in the numerator is a polynomial in the Am(θ)s and the denominator
is a sum of such polynomials, each of which is bounded below by 1
N
p0(θ), pˆn is a
continuous function. Continuity of the belief functions will be useful in showing
existence of equilibria.
1.3.2 Equilibrium with unrestricted information acquisition
I first turn to the case when G = GU . Let two signal structures g, g′ be equivalent
if they induce the same distribution over posteriors on θ. It is useful here to use
the characterization of binary choice with mutual information costs given by Wood-
ford(2008). This will provide both uniqueness and continuity of best responses in
pn.
Theorem 1 (Woodford 2008). In the model with unrestricted information acquisi-
tion, for a firm holding beliefs pn, there is a unique up to equivalence optimal signal
structure. Each signal in the support of an optimal signal structure leads to a pure
choice, that is a(s) ∈ {0, 1}. Also, the induced optimal acceptance probabilities An(θ)
satisfy
• if ∑ pn(θ)e− θk ≤ 1,∀θ An(θ) = 1
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• if ∑ pn(θ)e θk ≤ 1,∀θ An(θ) = 0
• otherwise, An(θ) is given by
An(θ)
1− An(θ) =
A¯
1− A¯e
θ
k , where (1.10)
A¯ =
∑
pn(θ)An(θ). (1.11)
Importantly, we can use the theorem to exclude mixtures over non-equivalent
signal structures (as they would each be optimal but non-equivalent). Mixing over
equivalent signal structures merely amounts to randomizing how information is ac-
quired, but not what is learned; the induced distributions over posteriors are the
same. Effectively, equivalent signal structures are mere relabellings.
Furthermore, Woodford (2008) shows that optimal actions can be summarized
as (An(θ))θ∈Θ, the optimal acceptance probability for each type; and that those are
unique. In effect, the theorem allows us to restrict to a much smaller strategy space
when looking for best responses. As this space is compact, equilibrium existence will
be easy to show.
It is useful at this point to define the function that takes firm n’s beliefs pn into
optimal acceptance probabilities as Aˆn : ∆Θ→ [0, 1]|Θ| using the rule given in (1.10)
and (1.11).
Theorem 2. For any N ∈ N, there exists an equilibrium in the model with N firms
and unrestricted information acquisition.
All proofs are in the appendix. As I have shown that we only need tro consider a
compact and convex action space, and Theorem 1 gives a continuous best response,
the proof of Theorem 2 is a straightforward application of Brouwer’s Fixed Point
Theorem.
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1.3.3 Equilibrium with restricted information acquisition
When G = GR, when the firm becomes informed, it is optimal to accept all θ ≥ 0.
Thus the only relevant choice is whether to acquire full or no information, with each
firm choosing a probability of playing each of these two actions. However, (1.9) implies
that the cost of becoming informed depends non-linearly on opponent strategies, the
Nash Existence Theorem does not apply. However, the restricted action space is
compact and allows an application of Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem once the best
response correspondences are shown to be closed-graph.
Theorem 3. For any N ∈ N, there exists an equilibrium in the model with N firms
and restricted information acquisition.
Neither of the existence theorems presented requires that the sequence in which
the applicant visits firms is uniformly distributed. What is required is that there is a
strictly positive probability for each firm to be the first visited, so that Bayes’ rule is
well-defined for every strategy profile6
1.4 Market Size
So far, I have kept the number of firms in the market fixed. This paper’s main results
pertain to the number of firms that can profit in the market.
1.4.1 Market size with unrestricted information acquisition
For the market with unrestricted information acquisition andN firms, two possibilities
arise. If the proportions and relative value of the types in the prior are too low, low
enough that even at the prior a monopolist is unwilling to acquire any information
or ever accept applicants, then the only equilibrium will be one in which no firms
profit. This will occur iff
∑
θ p0(θ)e
θ
k ≤ 1. Firms that have no profits acquire no
6That is, (1.9) must have a positive denominator.
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information7. If a monopolist cannot profit, it is quite clear that neither can more
firms, with the associated negative externality each imposes on the others. This
rather trivial case aside, Theorem 4 will show that as long as a monopolist would be
profitable, any number of firms are profitable, as equilibrium beliefs pn for any firm
n will also satisfy
∑
θ qm(θ)e
θ
k > 1.
This guaranteed profitability occurs because in any equilibrium, any profitable
firm’s rejected applicants will have a probability distribution qm so that
∑
θ pn(θ)e
θ
k =
1 holds exactly. Then, assuming a firm n gets a payoff of 0 and thus rejects all
applicants, the pool of potential applicants it receives is comprised of rejects from
some other firm m with type distribution qm as well as first-time applicants, with a
type distribution p0; thus, the average applicant pn will be a convex combination of
qm’s and p0 and as such will satisfy
∑
θ pn(θ)e
θ
k > 1. Therefore, the assumption that
firm n rejects all applicants and gets a payoff of 0 is contradicted.
This surprising result occurs because rejected applicants have been marginally
learned about. That is, optimal learning in the unrestricted information acquisition
setting requires that at the time of rejection, the rejecting firm has beliefs about
the applicant on the boundary of the set of profitable beliefs. If a firm is uncertain
whether an applicant has just been rejected at some other firm or is a new draw,
any interior probability weights on these two cases will produce beliefs about the
applicant’s type that allow the firm to make a profit.
Theorem 4. If a monopolist would be profitable, for every N ∈ N, in every equilib-
rium of the model with unrestricted information acquisition and N firms each firm
gets a strictly positive payoff.
The theorem implies that if there exist a finite number of potential firms, each of
which can decide to enter at sufficiently low cost, in equilibrium, they all will. If the
7The converse is not true; it is possible that a firm acquires no information but profitably accepts
the applicant.
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choice of information structure is unrestricted, the information acquisition technology
does not erect a barrier to entry.
Figure 1·1 shows how acceptance rates react to beliefs pn in a two-type market.
As the number of firms expands, the average acceptance probability for each firm A¯n
will approach 0, but reach it only in the limit; for any finite number of firms, infor-
mation will be worth acquiring for each firm. The figure illustrates how a lower prior
forces a firm to be more cautious, decreasing the acceptance rates for both types,
while increasing the ratio of the probability a good type is accepted to that a bad
type is accepted. As the number of firms increases, each firm moderates its accep-
tance probabilities, reducing its individual contribution to the market-level adverse
selection.
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Figure 1·1: Optimal acceptance rates in the unrestricted informa-
tion acquisition market with Θ = {−1, 1}, k = .4 as a function of the
probability that θ = 1.
1.4.2 Market size with restricted information acquisition
I now turn to the case when G = GR, when firms can choose to acquire either all or no
information. The main assumption I make is Π =
∑
θ>0 p0(θ)θ+k
∑
θ∈Θ p0(θ) ln p0(θ),
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which means that a monopolist would choose to become informed by purchasing the
perfectly informative signal structure. As with more firms the equilibrium beliefs are
worse than the monopolist’s, a profitable firm in this market must choose to become
informed.
As the number of profitable firms in the market grows, equilibrium beliefs get
worse. However, this may be uncertainty-reducing, as it increasingly concentrates
the prior on the negative types; therefore, the mutual information-based costs of
acquiring information may be decreasing.
Theorem 5 shows that the expected net benefit to acquiring information (rather
than rejecting all applicants) as a function of the number of firms that acquire infor-
mation is decreasing and eventually becomes negative.
It therefore shows that in a market with few firms, all will be profitable. For a
larger market, it provides an upper bound on the number of profitable firms, though
equilibria exist where mixed strategies make even fewer firms profitable. However, if
firms only enter if they expect to make strictly positive profits, Theorem 5 provides
a precise prediction about the number of firms.
Theorem 5. When k
∑
θ∈Θ p0(θ) ln p0(θ) >
∑
θ<0 θp0(θ), there exists an N¯ ∈ R such
that
(a) in the unique equilibrium of the model with restricted information acquisition
and N < N¯ firms, every firm gets a strictly positive payoff and
(b) in every equilibrium of the model with restricted information acquisition and
N > N¯ firms, at most N¯ firms get a strictly positive payoff.
Figure 1·2 displays, on the left, the payoffs to the strategies of rejecting the appli-
cant without information, accepting the applicant without information, and becoming
informed in order to accept if θ > 0. As the probability of the ‘good’ type varies, the
optimal strategy changes. If the prior is concentrated, whether it is good or bad, it
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is not worth becoming informed; it is in the middle region where gathering informa-
tion is optimal. The right-hand panel shows how choosing the optimal strategy as
displayed on the left results in acceptance probabilities for each type, and the average
acceptance probability. As the equilibrium belief becomes worse with the addition of
more firms, so long as firms are profitable, their behavior does not change; therefore,
the effect on adverse selection is not dampened by changes in equilibrium information
acquisition.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Reject All
Accept All
Learn
pn(1)
E
x
p
ec
te
d
P
ay
off
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
A¯
A(1)
A(−1)
pn(1)
A
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
R
at
e
Figure 1·2: Restricted information acquisition model when Θ =
{−1, 1}. Payoff to each strategy as a function of probability that θ = 1
(left); Optimal type-wise and average acceptance probability as a func-
tion of probability that θ = 1 (right).
1.4.3 Discussion
Comparison
The theorems in this section have shown that the information acquisition technology
limits the number of profitable firms in the restricted information market, but not
in the unrestricted information market. This results from the fact the restricted in-
formation market forces firms to buy ‘chunky’ information, which produces a larger
negative externality on other firms. By contrast, the unrestricted information acqui-
sition market allows for such fine-tuning that rejected applicants are not excessively
19
bad draws - merely marginally so. This sort of fine-tuning is a property shared by a
variety of continuous-time learning procedures, detailed in section 1.5, and is by no
means an artefact of mutual information costs.
I assumed only a single applicant. It is useful to think of the applicant side of
the market changing in size, and tracking the effect on the ‘market’ size. Crucially,
both market size theorems address the profitability of firms per applicant ; there are
no fixed costs. Therefore, surprisingly, the market size prediction is invariant to the
number of applicants when entry is free. If we consider costly entry, as the number
of applicants grows, the restricted information market will see an increase in the
number of active firms if initially less than bN¯c; but once there, it remains there.
The unrestricted information acquisition market with entry costs, on the other hand
(considering the symmetric equilibrium at each N) will grow without bounds as the
number of applicants increases.
Implicit Information Cascades
In the restricted information acquisition market, with too many (more than N¯) firms,
for some firms a visit leads to inference that the applicant is too likely to have been
rejected elsewhere to be worth considering. Although the actions of other firms are
not directly observable, information is carried by their strategies and Bayes’ Rule.
Furthermore, as the inferred action is rejection, and that action is then copied by
the inactive firm, the effect is similar to an information cascade, as in Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992). The inference, rather than the direct observation, of
the action being copied gives rise to what might be called an implicit information
cascade. Firms other than the N¯ allowed by Theorem 5 ‘copy’ the action they believe
has been taken with high probability by other firms, without even paying to view
their signal, in the same way that agents ignore their signals in BHW.
By contrast, such a cascade does not occur in the market with unrestricted infor-
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mation acquisition. Rejections are not as informative as in the restricted information
market, and the additional type uncertainty generated by the visit order leaves some
surplus for an additional firm.
Note that clearly, both technologies would lead to cascades if the visit order were
known. In the restricted information case, an applicant known to have been rejected
by another firm is known to have θ < 0 and therefore not worth considering. Similarly,
if a firm is observed to reject the applicant in the market with unrestricted information
acquisition, the posterior q(·) for that applicant now has ∑θ∈Θ q(θ)eθ/k = 1 which
means that the optimal action for all subsequent firms is to learn nothing and reject.
1.5 A theorem with continuous-time learning
Recent advances in the literature explore continuous-time learning for economic set-
tings. Drift-diffusion models have been used to discuss two-alternative choice as in
Fudenberg, Strack and Strzalecki (2015) and He´bert and Woodford (2016) consider a
broad class of continuous time information acquisition technologies. I will present a
theorem providing sufficient conditions for the outcome of Theorem 4 to apply in set-
tings where firms have such a technology available. Moreover, by stating assumptions
in terms of the properties of the solution to an unmodeled continuous-time informa-
tion acquisition problem, I will arrive at a very general characterization, one that in
fact implies Theorem 4.
1.5.1 Setting
In this section, I take a general statement of the outcome of a continuous time learning
process without modeling it in detail. It may represent an exogenous process that
the firm passively observes in preparation for a decision, or it may be driven by the
firm optimally choosing how to learn. Details such as costs enter only implicitly. I
21
denote by X the resulting stochastic process that describes in continuous time the
firm’s beliefs about θ given this learning. I give three conditions: that X’s path is
almost surely continuous with respect to time, that the firm makes its choice once
X exits some convex continuation set that is not growing over time, and that a firm
that engages in learning will in expectation make a profit. These conditions will be
enough to ensure a general version of Theorem 4 holds.
The rather sparse assumptions on this continuous-time result allow for a variety of
commonly used learning processes. Drift-diffusion models with constant (increasing)
time costs, for instance, satisfy. The mutual information model described earlier in
this paper can be sequentialized as well, in a way that fits these assumptions. These
stipulations do not hold, however, if X is the result of a fully revealing Poisson signal
- this latter case is the equivalent to the restricted information acquisition model.
1.5.2 Setup
Let {Xt : t ∈ R+} be a continuous-time martingale process in the probability simplex
over Θ denoting beliefs resulting from the firm’s optimal acquisition process and the
true value of θ. Its initial value is x0 = pn. The process results from some unmodeled
policy that depends on the current value xt, the time t, or both. Suppose furthermore
that this optimal policy contains a stopping rule, given by a closed stopping region
S(t) ⊆ ∆Θ that may vary with time. Assume that ∀t,S(0) ⊆ S(t) and that S is a
closed-graph correspondence of t. The stopping rule requires that the stopping time τ
satisfies τ = inf{t|xt ∈ S(t)}. Once the stopping rule is triggered at some τ , the firm
is assumed to make a decision to accept or reject the applicant based on the current
beliefs xτ . Assume furthermore that if x0 6∈ S(0), the firm’s ex-ante expected payoff
is positive.
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1.5.3 Result
This section’s result will rely, as did Theorem 4, on the intuition that rejections are in
some sense marginal. To generate this property, assume that the path of Xt is almost
surely a continuous function of t. Then, almost surely the posterior for rejections will
be marginal, and a similar theorem holds.
Lemma 1. If pn ∈ ∆Θ \ S(0), if Xt is almost surely continuous in t, then almost
surely for terminal τ , xτ ∈ ∆Θ \ S(0).
The optimal learning rule therefore implies that when learning terminates, the
rejecting firm’s beliefs about the applicant lie in the closure of the continuation set
∆Θ \ S(0).
Theorem 6. If Xt is almost surely continuous, almost surely terminates and ∆Θ \
S(0) is convex, if p0 ∈ ∆Θ \S(0), for every N ∈ N, in every equilibrium of the model
with N firms, every firm gets a positive expected payoff.
The theorem is proven by contradiction. If a n firm is inactive and gets 0 payoff,
it must be that its initial beliefs pn about applicants are in the stopping set. However,
each firm’s posterior about its rejected applicants will (almost surely) lie in the closure
of the initial continuation set ∆Θ\S(0) due to the continuity of the stochastic process.
Then, pn is just an appropriately-weighted convex combination of the prior p0 which
is in the interior of the initial continuation set, and points in the continuation set’s
closure. Given a convex initial continuation set ∆Θ \ S(0), pn must lie in its interior,
and by hypothesis a belief in the initial continuation set corresponds to a positive
expected payoff. Figure 1·3 illustrates the theorem for an arbitrary process when
|Θ| = 3.
As the unrestricted information acquisition one-shot model with mutual infor-
mation costs in this paper can be written as the output of optimal learning in a
continuous-time model with mutual information-restricted learning per unit time and
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Figure 1·3: Equilibrium beliefs pn for an inactive firm n are a convex
combination of the prior p0 and points on the marginal rejection line
(bold).
a constant time cost, Theorem 6 implies Theorem 4. The theorem also applies to
a wide class of learning processes described in He´bert and Woodford (2016), drift
diffusion models with non-decreasing time costs and other settings. To attain such
generality, however, Theorem 6 must be written in terms of the solution, not the
primitives, of some unspecified model. Nevertheless, an almost surely continuous
path for the learning process and a convex continuation set are both easy to verify
for a particular model. The market size result is therefore generalizable to a fairly
broad setting and not particular to the unrestricted information acquisition process
or a particular cost function.
Transporting the restricted information case into continuous time is also feasible,
as it can be modeled by a fully revealing variable with a Poisson arrival process
and constant time costs. Firms will choose to either accept the applicant without
information, reject the applicant without information, or wait until the arrival of the
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fully informative signal8, equivalently to the behavior in the restricted information
one-shot case. Too many firms using the waiting strategy would push equilibrium
beliefs for other firms into the region where profits cannot be attained; this limits the
number of firms.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I study a model of information acquisition in a search market. As
each firm’s actions affect the aggregate level of adverse selection, I explore how these
externalities compound as the number of firms expands. Unexpectedly, the model
shows that, with more firms, flexibility in information acquisition dampens the adverse
selection externality each causes, as they will produce marginal posteriors. On the
other hand, chunky information acquisition results in more pessimistic posteriors, so
that with enough firms, adverse selection grows to the point of eradicating profits. I
have argued that these results are relatively robust within a broad class of information
acquisition technologies.
I have shown that as a result of this form of adverse selection, the information
acquisition technology in a market can have strong implications about the number of
firms that will be active. A rich information menu will allow all firms to be profitable,
so with low enough entry costs many firms will enter. On the other hand, a chunky
information acquisition technology will limit the number of potential entrants.
This research highlights the need to study the qualitative aspects of information
acquisition as they appear in different contexts. It investigates what can loosely be
considered a novel type of barrier to entry, and its determinants.
Finally, the model invites a broad class of applications in investment, labor, in-
surance, and other markets. As each market is ostensibly endowed with its own
8Naturally, an indifferent firm could also employ a mixed strategy, or wait a finite amount of
time, which is also equivalent to mixing.
25
information acquisition technology, it is thus of paramount importance to consider
the differential effects policies may have on otherwise similar markets.
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Chapter 2
Discrimination and Worker
Evaluation (with Kevin Lang)
2.1 Introduction
Many African-Americans believe black workers ‘don’t get second chances’1 or that
they face additional scrutiny in the workplace. Similarly, black workers are admon-
ished to be ‘twice as good’2 in order to succeed. If black workers are subject to
higher standards or scrutinized more heavily, we expect this to be reflected in more
separations.
Indeed, the data support the idea of shorter employment duration3 for black work-
ers. Bowlus, Kiefer and Neumann (2001) detect and ponder the disparity in job de-
struction rates; Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) estimate4 that young black male high
school graduates had roughly 2/3 the job spell duration of their white counterparts,
despite more of their job spells ending in unemployment. Both papers assume an
1This assertion can be found in a range of occupations including football coaching (Reid, 2015),
music and films (The Guardian, 2014) as well as more generally (Spencer, 2014).
2Coates, Ta-Nehisi (2012) and Mabry, Marcus (2012)
3Throughout this paper we refer to employment duration by which we mean the length of an
employment spell rather than job duration by which we mean the time a worker spends with a
particular employer. Job duration depends on, among other factors, the arrival rate of outside
offers. Our model abstracts from job-to-job transitions.
4Using the NLSY data for 1985 and 1988.
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exogenously higher separation rate for black workers to fit their models to the data.
Lang and Lehmann (2012) show that differences in unemployment duration alone
are insufficient to account for the black/white unemployment gap and therefore that
black workers’ employment stints are shorter. This aspect of labor discrimination has
thus far eluded theoretical explication.
In this paper, our proposed explanation for differential employment durations is,
in its broadest sense and consistent with the aforementioned observations, that firms
discriminate in acquisition or use of productivity-relevant information. That is, firms
either learn differently about black workers or, when information regarding ability is
received, they condition how they act on it on workers’ race. Crucially, we establish
that such discrimination can be self-perpetuating.
We develop a model in which differences in job duration arise naturally and their
relation to skill is plausible. The essence of our model is that, because black workers
are more closely scrutinized, a larger share of low-performance workers will separate
into unemployment. As a result, since productivity is correlated across jobs, the black
unemployment pool is ‘churned’ and therefore weaker than the white unemployment
pool. Since workers can, at least to some extent, hide their employment histories,
race serves as an indicator of expected worker productivity. This in turn makes
monitoring newly hired black (but not white) workers optimal for firms. Figure 1
illustrates employment in the two labor markets.
There are multiple equilibria in our model, a property it shares with models of
rational stereotyping or self-confirming expectations (Coate and Loury, 1993). How-
ever, in our model discrimination is not simply a product of coordination failure;
instead, history matters. A group that begins with a low level of skills for which only
the bad (monitoring) equilibrium exists will remain in that equilibrium even if its skill
level rises to a level consistent with the existence of both the good and bad equilibria.
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Figure 2·1: White workers’ perpetual employment, black workers’
churning cycle
Even if blacks are, on average, more skilled than whites, whites can be in the good
steady-state and blacks in the bad steady-state because of a history of lower access to
schooling and other human capital investments. Equalizing the human capital that
blacks and whites bring to the labor market may be insufficient to equalize labor
market outcomes. In contrast, in self-confirming expectations models, if we could just
convince blacks to invest in themselves and employers that blacks have invested, we
would immediately jump to the good equilibrium.
There is an abundance of evidence that black workers face lower wages and longer
unemployment duration than white workers. Moreover, these disparities are less
prevalent and, perhaps, in some cases nonexistent for the most skilled workers as
measured by education or performance on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test. While
there are a plethora of models intended to explain wage or unemployment differentials,
none addresses both and their relation to skill.5 Since in our model newly hired black
5Many models (e.g. Aigner and Cain, 1977; Becker, 1971; Bjerk, 2008; Charles and Guryan, 2011;
Coate and Loury, 1993; Fryer, 2007; Lang, 1986; Lang and Manove, 2011; Lundberg and Startz,
1983; Moro and Norman, 2004) assume market clearing and therefore cannot address unemployment
patterns. Search models (e.g. Black, 1995; Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002; Lang and Manove, 2003;
Lang, Manove and Dickens, 2005; Rosen, 1997) can explain unemployment differentials, but assume
otherwise homogeneous workers and thus cannot address wage differentials at different skill levels.
Peski and Szentes (2013) treat wages as exogenous. In general, discrimination models have not
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workers are on average less productive than white ones, firms that expect to hire blacks
anticipate less profit from a vacancy and therefore offer fewer jobs. Consequently,
blacks have longer unemployment durations. Also, since they both spend more time
searching for a job and are believed to be less productive on hiring, blacks earn less
over their lifetimes. Additionally, the higher level of scrutiny increases the return to
skill for blacks, consistent with evidence that blacks invest more in schooling compared
with apparently equivalent whites.
We derive additional implications from informal extensions to the model. The
higher level of scrutiny increases the return to skill for blacks, consistent with evidence
that blacks invest more in schooling compared with apparently equivalent whites. In
addition, if unemployment history is partially observable, black job seekers who have
experienced enough turnover may be permanently relegated to low-skill, low-wage
jobs. Although we do not wish to overstate the predictive power of the model, we note
that until around 1940, blacks and whites had similar unemployment rates (Fairlie and
Sundstrom, 1999), while blacks faced lower wages. This is consistent with a setting
in which, due to low human capital investments, blacks were assumed to have low
productivity at most jobs and therefore not monitored for quality. ‘Churning’ of the
black labor market would not begin until human capital investments were sufficiently
high.
We believe that the broad implications of our model can be derived through a
variety of formalizations. The key elements common to these are:
i. that a worker’s productivity at different firms is correlated,
ii. that workers cannot or do not signal their ability and that they can, at least
imperfectly, hide their employment histories,6
addressed employment duration. See the review in Lang and Lehmann (2012).
6In particular, they must sometimes be able to omit or mischaracterize prior bad matches.
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iii. that firms must therefore, to some degree, statistically infer worker ability,
iv. that further information about match productivity is costly, imperfect, or both,
and
v. that this information, if obtained, may affect hiring or retention, so that firm
behavior affects the average unemployed worker’s ability.
The details of our formal model are driven by our desire for a theoretically rigorous
model of wage-setting in a dynamic framework with asymmetric information. Firms
and workers bargain over wages and use a costly monitoring technology to assess the
quality of the match, which is correlated with the worker’s underlying type. We argue
that separating worker-types is impossible without commitment to monitor, as the
workers with the greatest incentive to be monitored for match quality while their type
is unknown to the firm (those privately sure to be a good match) are also the ones
for whom monitoring is most ex-post inefficient.
Therefore, use of the monitoring technology depends on the firm’s prior: if the
belief that a worker is well-matched is sufficiently high or sufficiently low, it will not
be worth investing resources to determine match quality. However, if the cost of
determining the match quality is not too high, there will be an intermediate range at
which this investment is worthwhile. Firm beliefs about black, but not white, workers
fall in this region. Consequently, they are subject to heightened scrutiny and are more
likely to be found to be a poor match and fired. The increased scrutiny ensures that
the pool of unemployed black workers has a higher proportion of workers who have
been found to be a poor match at one or more prior jobs. And therefore employers’
expectations that black workers are more likely to be poor matches is correct in
equilibrium. This, nested in a search model, generates the empirical predictions
discussed above.7
7Note that our model abstracts from moral hazard and that performance is observed objectively.
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This churning equilibrium is hard to escape. This is disheartening since policy
succeeding at convergence of group characteristics may fail to equate labor market
outcomes. Only if the skill level of blacks is raised sufficiently above that of whites
(technically the proportion of good workers is sufficiently high), does the bad equi-
librium cease to exist and white and black workers receive similar treatment.
2.2 A simple example of churning
To provide some intuition, we first consider a simple discrete-time market in which
we abstract from wage bargaining and vacancy creation decisions. These will play a
central role in the full model.
A unit mass of worker is born every period. Suppose new workers have a prob-
ability g = 2/3 of being type α and producing qα = 1 unit per period and with the
remaining probability are type β and produce qβ = 0. Each unemployed worker who
has not been publicly revealed to be type β is matched to a firm at the beginning
of the period. Wages are set to w = 1/3 exogenously,8 to be endogenized in the full
model. Firms can either hire a worker indefinitely, or hire for a single period with
monitoring costing b = 4/3, which reveals a β employee to the firm with a proba-
bility 1/2, then firing those revealed and keeping the rest indefinitely following that.
Matches do not dissolve naturally and the discount factor is δ = .95.
To show churning can persist in environments where the market learns about
worker ability rather quickly, we assume that the second revelation of a β worker is
public. Such a worker is not hired again, and thus exits this labor market for one
with lower wages and production that is less type-sensitive9 - unlike one revealed only
MacLeod (2003) develops an interesting model in which biased subjective assessments interact with
moral hazard concerns.
8This is half the expected surplus of a new worker.
9In the context of our main model, we call this degenerating into ‘dead end jobs’ in the extension
presented in Section 2.5.5.
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once, who is re-matched next period.
Consider first a market with only first-time job seekers. A firm that hires but does
not monitor a worker earns
g(qα − w)/r + (1− g)(qβ − w)/r = 80
9
− 20
9
=
20
3
.
One that does monitor to fire revealed βs (recall they stay for one period) earns
g(qα − w)/r + (1− g)
[
1
2
(qβ − w)/r + 1
2
(qβ − w)
]
− b = 80
9
− 21
18
− 4
3
=
115
18
<
20
3
.
So, a firm will prefer not to monitor newly hired workers. Consequently, no β workers
are revealed or fired, and all unemployed workers are first-time job seekers as assumed.
Now consider a market that has been churned by the monitoring technology. In
each period, half the β workers who got their first job the previous period are fired
and return to the job-seeking pool where they join a new batch of β workers of size
1− g and α workers of size g; thus the probability a newly hired worker is of type α
is gc = g/ (g + (1− g) + .5(1− g)) = 4/7.
An employer in this market who does not monitor will get a payoff of
gc(qα − w)/r + (1− gc)(qβ − w)/r = 160
21
− 60
21
=
100
21
whereas one who does monitor expects a payoff of
gc(qα−w)/r+ (1− gc)
[
1
2
(qβ − w)/r + 1
2
(qβ − w)
]
− b = 160
21
− 21
14
− 4
3
=
201
42
>
100
21
.
Thus workers in the second, or ‘churned’, market are monitored and can be fired.
This simplistic model demonstrates how two groups with the same underlying
abilities can face very different treatment, and that this process can be self-enforcing.
It captures churning-induced discrimination. Since only one group suffers separa-
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tions, we interpret this as an employment duration differential. To address wage and
unemployment duration differentials however, we will need the main model.
This simple example also helps demonstrate an important point: history matters.
It is readily confirmed that the market switches from monitoring to not monitoring
when the proportion of αs in the labor market surpasses 11/19 and that firms will
make a loss if this proportion is less than 29/101. Consider a group for which histori-
cally the proportion α was less than 29/101 and was therefore employed in some other
type of job. Now let improvements in human capital lead new entrants in period t to
have a proportion α equal to .3; also, let this proportion grow to 2/3 in period t+ 1
and remain at this level thereafter. The group never exits the churning equilibrium.
Despite a legacy of only one generation in which the quality of the inflow favored
churning, the group would remain stuck in the churning equilibrium until some time
after the proportion α in the new generation exceeded 33/49.
The example also shows that it is not essential that a worker’s employment history
be entirely opaque. Even though workers can only hide a single dismissal, the churning
mechanism operates and induces a worse steady state.
2.3 The Model
We now present our model. As in the model in Section 2, employers statistically infer
past employment based on race and may therefore discriminate in monitoring and
retention; this can in turn churn the labor market and thus self-perpetuate. The main
model’s richer ontology will now enable us to address wage setting, unemployment
duration and a host of other questions.
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2.3.1 Setup
There are two worker groups, ‘blacks’ and ‘whites’. Race is observable by the worker
and employers but does not have any direct impact on production.
At all times a steady flow of new workers is born into each population group.10 A
proportion g ∈ (0, 1) of new workers are type α, for whom every job is a good match.11
The rest, referred to as type β, have probability β ∈ (0, 1) of being a good match at
any particular job. The probability of a worker being good at a job, conditional on
her type, is independent across jobs. Worker type is private to the worker. Workers
begin their lives unemployed. We define the average probability of being good at a
particular job among new job seekers as
θ0 = g + (1− g) β. (2.1)
Employers cannot directly observe worker type or employment history,12 but can
instead draw statistical inferences from race.
2.3.2 Match Quality
Production, the payment of wages and the use of the monitoring technology occur in
continuous time using a common discount rate r.
Workers can be either well-suited to a task (a ‘good’ match), producing q per
unit time; or ill-suited (a ‘bad’ match), producing expected output q − λc per unit
time. We can interpret the lower productivity of bad workers as errors or missed
opportunities, each costing the firm c, that arrive at a constant rate λ. Under this
10We do not allow for death but could do so at the cost of a little added complexity.
11Having type α workers perform well at every job does not appear to be essential to the argument
but does appear to be essential to having comprehensible mathematics.
12At a more informal level, we believe that workers have some ability to hide their employment
history and that they will not report information speaking to their own low ability. We show the
model is robust to imperfect history revelation in Section 2.5.5.
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interpretation, opportunities for error are also opportunities to learn the quality of
the match as well-matched workers are observed to avoid errors.13
For monitoring to ever be useful, matches revealed to be bad must separate.
To this end, we make the sufficient and simple assumption that such a match is
unproductive:
(C1) q − λc ≤ 0.
It is much stronger than necessary. In general, if the worker and firm know that the
match is bad, it will be efficient for the worker to experience some unemployment in
order to try a new match; this is a consequence of productivity conditional on worker
type being match-specific. Assumption (C1) ensures that such separation in search
of a better match is efficient regardless of the expected duration of unemployment.14
Neither the employer nor a type β worker can know the match quality without
monitoring. The parties can agree to a costly regime of monitoring that may produce
a fully informative, bilaterally observable signal about match quality. In keeping
with the opportunities-for-errors interpretation, we assume the signal arrives at a
constant hazard rate λ. The monitoring technology costs b per unit time, so that
the expected cost of information is
∫∞
0
be−λtdt = b/λ and its expected discounted
cost is
∫∞
0
(e−rtb)e−λtdt = b/ (λ+ r). The principal benefit of a signal whose arrival
is exponentially distributed, rather than one that arrives deterministically, is that it
makes the employment survival function more realistic. In addition, it allows for a
certain stationarity in the model: so long as no signal has arrived, the underlying
incentives do not change.
13Alternatively, we could assume that the flows are q − d and q with d ≡ λc and that λ is the
arrival rate of opportunities to measure the flows.
14Nothing of interest is ruled out here; if known bad matches don’t end, then costly monitoring
for separation is never worth paying for.
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2.3.3 Job Search
When a worker is born or her match is terminated, she becomes unemployed. Un-
employed workers are stochastically matched to firms, which occurs at a constant
hazard µ. For the moment, we treat this rate as exogenous; it will be endogenized in
Section 2.5.4 to address unemployment duration. When a match dissolves, transfers
cease and the worker becomes unemployed. A firm does not recoup a vacancy and
therefore receives a payoff of 0 on termination.15
In the unemployed state, workers merely search for new jobs; we normalize the
flow utility from this state to 0. The value from unemployment is thus simply the
appropriately discounted expected utility from job-finding and is invariant to history.
The discount on job-finding is
∫∞
0
e−rtµe−µtdt = µ/ (µ+ r); the value of a new job
will depend on the equilibrium. We denote the value of the job-finding state as Uα
for type α workers and Uβ for type β workers.
2.3.4 Bargaining
Informal Description
In the interest of modeling wage determination, this section ends up being more tech-
nical than may be of interest to readers who are primarily interested in discrimination.
We therefore begin with a brief intuitive discussion which we hope will be sufficient
to permit such readers to skip the technical discussion.
We cannot use Nash bargaining because there is no accepted model of Nash bar-
gaining with asymmetric information. Instead, we use a bargaining model in which
workers and firms make alternating offers. We assume that the parties may unilater-
ally reopen bargaining at any time but with a delay. Offers take the form of a wage
and monitoring regime. If the regime involves no monitoring, no new information
15This occurs naturally due to free entry when vacancy creation is endogenized; see Section 2.5.4.
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arises. If the regime involves monitoring, bad matches will separate, and those shown
to be good will renegotiate so as to not continue monitoring.
A critical question is whether the bargaining can reveal workers’ private infor-
mation about their type. Intuitively, firms might propose a monitoring offer that
would attract one type and then a no monitoring offer that would attract the other.
Alternatively, a worker could try to signal her type by bargaining tactics, effectively
engaging in ‘money burning’. The problem is that if separation occurs, α workers
and firms should immediately renegotiate to a no-monitoring regime with a high
wage reflecting the fact that the match is known to be good. But this is also the
best possible outcome for a β worker. So, knowing that renegotiation will occur im-
mediately, β workers will pretend to be αs, so such type-separating solutions fail to
exist. Thus separation in this setting would require commitment, even in the face of
Pareto-improving alternatives.
Since they do not wish to reveal themselves, in the solution β workers negotiate
as if they were type α. The firm therefore evaluates offers as though the worker is an
average of the two types. As in the Rubinstein (1982) model, there is no utility flow
while bargaining.
When there is no monitoring and the firm believes the match is good with prob-
ability θ, as the bargaining delay disappears the worker receives w/r and the firm
receives (q − (1− θ)λc− w) /r. This is split by an average (over proposers) wage of
.5(q − (1− θ)λc),
as in the Nash bargaining solution. Lemma 2 shows each party values a revealed good
match at .5q/r.
When monitoring takes place, bargaining splits the cost equally on average. In
addition to that however, a new term appears reflecting that firms and workers eval-
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uate the probability of the match being good differently. Again abstracting from
bargaining delays, the wage is
1
2
(q − b− λc(1− θ))− (1− θ)
2
λ
q
2r
.
This would also obtain as the equal-weights Nash bargaining outcome of an α worker
bargaining with a firm with belief θ that the match is good, with 0 outside options.
Since all workers bargain as αs who know the match is good but firms have belief
θ, workers are more impatient to get to revelation and therefore bargain as if delays
were more costly. This means that monitored workers bear not only their share of
the monitoring cost but an additional “Pooling Penalty.” As in Nash bargaining, the
monitoring policy is efficient from the standpoint of firms and α workers.
In the next subsections we impose conditions to ensure that monitoring is in-
deed optimal in the churned (black) labor market only and that type separation is
infeasible. We furthermore make bargaining stationarity assumptions that empower
off-path renegotiation as a way to exclude equilibria supported by either unreasonable
off-path beliefs or repeated-games-style ‘punishments’. We then derive both steady-
state solutions of the full alternating-offers bargaining model when the time between
offers is small. Readers who are less interested in the technical details may wish to
skim the material until Section 2.4.
The Formal Bargaining Model
Wage and monitoring contracts are determined by alternating-offers bargaining with
a delay of ∆.16 An offer is a pair (w,m) ∈ R×{0, 1} comprised of a wage w per unit
16Although the standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model uses Nash bargaining, it requires
symmetric information and therefore is unusable in our setting. Evidence from Hall and Milgrom
(2008) suggests that their own Rubinstein variant with added pecuniary costs of delay is able to
produce far more realistic unemployment predictions than Nash bargaining. Our model shares the
feature that enables this prediction (workers’ outside option not dampening firm payoff fluctuations).
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time paid continuously and a policy m of using or not the monitoring technology.17
When a match is first formed, a first proposer is chosen with equal probability on
the firm and worker. Production, monitoring and wages cease during bargaining. We
are interested in solutions when ∆ is low.
Most importantly, either partner may unilaterally choose to re-open negotiations
at any time by causing a single delay of length ∆ during which production and wages
are suspended. Once this delay expires, the party instigating renegotiation is placed
in the role of proposer.18 The choice to reopen negotiation is logically simultaneous
at each time, and if both partners wish to reopen negotiations at the same instant
they each assume the role of proposer with probability 1/2.
Thus, there is no commitment to any agreement. This is important. If the wage
is independent of worker type, it will generally fall between the wages that would
be negotiated by a known β and by a known α. Therefore, starting from a common
wage, if a worker is revealed to be an α, she will renegotiate to raise her wage, while
the firm will renegotiate a lower wage if the worker is revealed to be a β. This creates
an environment hostile to separating equilibria.
With the impermanence of deals, however, we now open ourselves to repeated-
games type equilibria where the acceptance of bad offers, and intransigence in insisting
on them, is enforced by off-path punishment. To recover the uniqueness of Rubinstein
bargaining from this, we make an assumption:
(S0) Stationarity: Consider histories where firm beliefs put probability 1 on a certain
17We assume that offers entail constant wages and monitoring, a limitation. Allowing time-varying
wage profiles to be offered does not affect our findings but results in the loss of some elegance. We
can show that our results hold for the average wage over a small interval that is nevertheless large
relative to the bargaining delay but cannot rule out wages that, for example, alternate between a high
and low wage with each wage maintained for a period equal to the bargaining delay. If we further
assume that wages and monitoring can be contingent on the signal arriving, we require additional
assumptions on the delay, ∆, to preserve our results; at the cost of considerable complexity, the
equilibrium derived here is essentially unique as ∆ ↓ 0.
18This delay on renegotiation ensures that disagreeable offers are rejected rather than accepted
with the intent to renegotiate instantly.
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worker type or match quality. There are no deviating offers at such histories
that if not renegotiated (in the case of uncertain match quality, until revelation)
improve19 the payoff of the proposer while giving the receiver more than the
once-discounted expected value at their previous offer (or, if this is the first
offer, the receiver’s once-discounted value of offering first).
Stationarity allows for precisely the kind of argument present in standard Rubin-
stein bargaining. A party who makes offers it values at x should be willing to accept
offers it values at e−r∆x. This further allows us to dispense with repeated-games type
inefficient behavior, such as strategies that waste most of the surplus under the threat
of wasting even more of the surplus.
At this point we want to assume that the bargaining delay is not too large for the
parties to renegotiate to shut off monitoring after match quality revelation.
(C2) e−r∆ · q > q − b.
In fact, we want to think of the bargaining delay as being vanishingly small and do
our analysis in Sections 5 and 6 treating it as such.
Bearing this in mind, we additionally postulate that
(C3) e−r∆ >
µ
µ+ r
to ensure that for a worker, rejecting an offer and making a counter offer is, in
expectation, faster than separating in order to find a new match where the worker
might be the first proposer (for simplicity, we formalize this as though he will be the
first proposer). Counter-offering is quicker than finding a new employer to make an
offer to. Again, this condition must always be satisfied for sufficiently small ∆.
19A delay caused by rejecting an equilibrium offer or reopening negotiations is of course factored
in to deciding whether a deviating proposal is payoff-improving to the proposer.
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Bargaining solution with symmetric information
First, let us find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) solution where bar-
gaining occurs under symmetric information. Using S0, the parties will make station-
ary offers and split the output according to the Rubinstein shares, 1/(1+e−r∆) for the
first proposer and e−r∆/(1+e−r∆) for the responder. These shares are delivered via a
constant wage, avoiding renegotiation in the absence of information from monitoring.
Known Bad Match. By (C1), the match would forever produce a negative
average flow should it persist, so it instead separates.
Known Good Match. The total match surplus is the discounted value of pro-
ducing q for all time,
∫∞
0
qe−rt dt = q/r. The first proposer therefore earns
1
1 + e−r∆
· q
r
.
We can now show that matches in which revelation of good quality occurred via
a policy of monitoring will instantly renegotiate:
Lemma 2. If monitoring reveals a match to be good, both parties request renegotia-
tion; they each expect a payoff of e−r∆q/ (2r) upon such revelation.
Proof. See B.1
As the bargaining under symmetric information will be efficient, we can decouple
the monitoring decision from wage setting and proceed to examine the latter.
Known β, no monitoring. Worker type is commonly known to be β, and the
match is of unknown quality. The average over match qualities cost of errors per unit
time is (1− β)λc. Total match surplus is therefore
SNβ =
q − (1− β)λc
r
. (2.2)
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The first proposer therefore receives
1
1 + e−r∆
· q − (1− β)λc
r
. (2.3)
Known β, monitoring. If the match is revealed by the signal to be bad, separa-
tion occurs; the firm receives 0 and the worker Uβ. By Lemma 2, when the match is
revealed to be good, each player expects a payoff of qe−r∆/(2r). Expected discount on
revelation is
∫∞
0
e−rt · λe−λt dt = λ/ (λ+ r). For expected discounted pre-revelation
total wages W , the worker’s total expected payoff is
W +
λ
λ+ r
(
β
qe−r∆
2r
+
(
1− β
)
Uβ
)
. (2.4)
The firm’s payoff, remembering a separation has a value of 0, is
q − (1− β)λc− b
λ+ r
−W + λ
r + λ
(
β
qe−r∆
2r
+
(
1− β
)
· 0
)
. (2.5)
The total surplus from the match is therefore
SMβ =
q − b
λ+ r
− (1− β)λc
λ+ r
+
λβ
λ+ r
qe−r∆
r
+
λ(1− β)
λ+ r
Uβ. (2.6)
We can solve for the instantaneous wage, which averages (over proposers) to
wMβ = .5 (q − (1− β)λc− b)− .5 (1− β)λUβ.20 (2.7)
Continuation play from an off-path history in any of the above cases is for both players
to request immediate renegotiation and propose the equilibrium shares, unless both
players are receiving greater than the receiver’s share by the current offer (in which
20The solution has the somewhat disturbing property that the worker’s value following separation
lowers the wage. The worker is impatient for the opportunity to ‘try again’ if she turns out to be
bad at the job. Similarly to most alternating offers models, the outside option does not directly
affect the outcome here. However, as β workers will not be strategically revealed, we do not observe
wages with this property.
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case the status quo offer continues until revelation).
2.3.5 Steady State
A steady state of a labor market is a mass of α job seekers, a mass of β job seekers
and a mass of monitored β workers along with equilibrium firm and worker strategies
that make these populations constant over time. There are two kinds of stable steady
states: those in which all employees are monitored until match quality is revealed,
and those in which no monitoring occurs.21
Consider the case where no employees are monitored: the white labor market.
Matches never deteriorate and therefore the only source of job seekers is newly born
workers. In this scenario, a firm just matched with an employee infers his probability
of being of type α is the population prevalence g; the chance of a white job-seeker
being good at a job to which he is matched is therefore
θW = θ0 = g + (1− g)β.
Now suppose that all newly hired black employees are monitored and all bad
matches are terminated. Newly matched black workers will be worse than average.
Lemma 3. The probability a newly hired black worker is in a good match is
θB =
β
βg + (1− g) < θW . (2.8)
Proof. See B.2
Therefore, although monitoring may be individually prudent for each matched
pair, it creates a negative externality by feeding a stream of workers who are worse
than the population average (i.e. containing more β types) back into the job-seeker
21A steady state in which only some workers are monitored until revelation is not stable as it
implies indifference and a mixed strategy for the firm. A perturbation in θ will lead to either
complete or no monitoring, causing movement away from the steady state.
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pool. Surprisingly, the steady state θB of this process does not depend on the rate
of information λ, the worker matching rate µ or the rate at which new workers enter
the market.22
2.3.6 Solution Concept
We are interested in solutions that fulfill the following criteria in addition to S0:
S1 Steady State: The labor market is in steady state.
S2 PBE: Firm and worker strategies form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
S3 Stationarity/No Dictatorial Beliefs: At no history with firm beliefs θh ∈ (β, 1)
on the match being good can a deviating offer be made that, should it stay in
place until revelation and beliefs be fixed at θh until revelation:
a) strictly improves the payoff of a proposing firm or α worker, and either
b1) if the first offer in a match, improves on the lesser of the receiving firm or
α worker’s once-discounted first-proposer payoff or equilibrium payoff at
the current node, or
b2) if a subsequent offer, gives a greater payoff to a receiving firm or α worker
than their once-discounted expected payoff at their previous offer.
Restriction S3 requires some explanation. Its primary purpose is to provide
uniqueness. It allows α workers to make off-equilibrium offers that are beneficial
to them without having to worry about the offers’ effect on beliefs. It furthermore
allows firms to make offers that the best workers should accept without those workers
worrying about a deleterious effect acceptance has on beliefs.
22This is an artifact of the assumption that workers are infinitely lived.
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This restriction ensures that the bargaining protocol will produce real bargaining
and Rubinstein-like solutions rather than dogmatic offers backed by the threat of
belief change or punishment off-path. Lacking S3, low wages could be maintained
by the firm believing any deviation is due to the worker being type β. By providing
for deviations from such situations without belief ramifications, we eliminate these
distasteful equilibria.23
2.3.7 Parametric Assumptions
Now we impose certain restrictions on the joint values of parameters sufficient to
ensure the existence of both solutions.
For an equilibrium with no monitoring to exist for white workers, we want to
assume that monitoring costs are not too low. Initially, we want to abstract from
bargaining frictions; in the limit as ∆ disappears, the first parameter restriction can
be stated as saying that monitoring costs exceed the sum of the benefits to the firm
and α worker.
b
λ︸︷︷︸
Mon. cost
>
Wage Increase︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− θW )λc
2r︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revelation Gain to α
+
Bad Match End Benefit︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− θW )(λc
r
− q
2r
− (1− θW )λc
2r
)−
Wage Increase︷ ︸︸ ︷
θW (1− θW )λc
2r︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revelation Gain to Firm
(2.9)
Restating this limiting condition to constrain β and g rather than the monitoring
costs and recalling that λc− q/2 is guaranteed to be positive due to (C1), we get
θW = g + (1− g)β ≥ 1− r
λ
· b
λc− q
2
⇒ (1− β)(1− g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability Match is Bad
<
b
λ
λc
r
− q
2r
. (2.10)
However, as we wish to derive equilibria when bargaining delays are nonzero,
things are a bit more complicated. Expression (2.9), when accounting for bargaining
23Without S3, workers could be forced to accept far below half the average surplus even if match
quality was unobservable in principle - despite types having identical incentives.
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frictions, transforms into the rather less interpretable
(C4)
b
λ
> (1− θW )λc
r
− q(2− e
−r∆(1 + θW ))
2r
.
Unsurprisingly, this condition is still of the form “monitoring costs must not be too
low.” On the left hand side is the instantaneous cost of information, b/λ. On the right
hand side, the losses to the employer that result from bad matches, which would end if
monitoring is successful, minus a measure of production lost to both separations and
delays due to renegotiation when match quality revelation occurs.24 Strictness of the
inequality ensures persistence and stability. Condition (C4) guarantees that a type
α worker (who is more eager for monitoring) does not want to propose monitoring if,
having done so, the employer will not update beliefs; firm beliefs θW are good enough.
Our second condition, antisymmetrically to (C4), posits that “monitoring costs
must not be too high”and ensures the monitoring equilibrium also exists:
(C5)
b
λ
< (1− θB)λc
r
− q(2− e
−r∆(1 + θB))
2r
.
This condition establishes that, in the black (‘churned’) labor market with a
pooling monitoring equilibrium, it is not profitable for α types to deviate to a no-
monitoring offer if this would not change the employer’s belief. In other words θB,
the belief about the average ability in the black unemployed pool, must be sufficiently
low that α workers prefer to be monitored. Strictness of the inequality ensures that
switching to an unchurned market is not simply a matter of switching equilibria (as
the non-monitoring one will not exist here).
Combining conditions (C4) and (C5), in the limit as ∆ ↓ 0, we get
(1− β)(1− g) <
b
λ
λc
r
− q
2r
<
(1− β)(1− g)
βg + (1− g) . (2.11)
24As an α worker and firm hold different beliefs about the probability of a bad match, the lost
production is estimated using their average beliefs.
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That is, the ratio of the average costs of monitoring to a measure of its benefits lies
strictly between the rate of bad matches in the two markets.
The two remaining conditions rule out the complexities associated with partial
pooling. We assume that the efficient outcome for a match of unknown quality in
which the worker is revealed to be type β is to monitor. This is the case even when
it takes a single delay to renegotiate:
(C6) max{SNβ, 0} < e−r∆ · SMβ
where SNβ is the surplus from a known β match without monitoring and SMβ is the
surplus from a known β match with monitoring, both derived in Section 2.3.4. This
further allows us to say that there is positive surplus from these matches; it is not
detrimental to social welfare that β workers are employed at all. Assuming (C6)
allows us to say that since αs benefit more than βs from monitoring, if βs want to
reveal themselves in order to be monitored, αs will want to pretend to be βs. Second,
in the absence of (C6), it is difficult to rule out mixed strategy equilibria where some
β workers reveal themselves to avoid monitoring costs.
Finally, we require that the black equilibrium pooling wage is no lower than the
wage β workers could get by revealing their type:
(C7)
e−r∆(q − b− λ(1− θB))− (1− e−r∆θB)qe−r∆/ (2r)
(1 + e−r∆)
> wMβ.
Condition (C7) provides that βs must prefer pooling with monitoring to revealing
their type and being monitored. As discussed, βs gain from pooling with αs because
of believed higher productivity but lose because it is costly for them to bargain as if
they were αs. This can be rewritten as a restriction on β. If β is near 0, θB will also
be near 0, and the benefits of pooling will be diminished.
Note that if (C6) and/or (C7) is violated, it will still not be an equilibrium for
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all βs to reveal themselves, as any worker not doing so would earn the revealed good
payoff, .5e−r∆q/r. Thus the benefit of these conditions is that they allow us to rule
out equilibria in which some, but not all, βs reveal their type.
It is not self-evident that (C4)-(C7) can hold simultaneously. In Section 2.6 we
provide an example with plausible parameters in which they do.
2.4 Solution
We present the main results of the paper: existence and essential uniqueness of equi-
libria in the two markets that perpetuate their associated steady states.
2.4.1 The Non-Monitored Market
Proposition 1. Assuming (C1)-(C7), the white (non-churned) labor market has a
solution where the monitoring technology is not used on-path. Employed workers,
regardless of type, receive their Rubinstein share of the surplus. In the limit as ∆ ↓ 0
their wage is
wNθw = .5[q − (1− θW )λc]. (2.12)
Proposition 2. The above equilibrium is unique.
All proofs are in the appendix.
The main intuition here flows from (C4), the lack of commitment and S3. On
the one hand, (C4) tells us that α workers would only really want to deviate to a
monitoring offer if they could affect beliefs by doing so - beliefs are high enough that
the wage is already good in equilibrium. On the other hand, if it were possible for
α workers to reveal themselves by making a monitoring offer, then as soon as they
made it, beliefs would change, and S3 would allow them to make a new, improved
no-monitoring offer also preferable to β workers.
Interestingly, since the firm cannot learn the worker’s type in this non-churned
equilibrium, type has no effect on wages. The firm’s prior, θW , is high enough that
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even good workers do not wish to pay to reveal match quality.
2.4.2 The Monitored Market
Whether or not the equilibrium involves monitoring, αs are always willing to pay
more than βs to be monitored since they know the match is good. In the monitored
(black) labor market, average job-seeker quality θB is low and the firm’s expected
error costs, λc(1 − θB), are high. These expected costs are shared with the workers,
so both firms and α workers wish to reveal match quality. But then βs must follow
suit lest they be revealed. All workers must therefore bargain as if they were type α
and make offers with monitoring.
Proposition 3. Assuming (C1)-(C7), the black (churned) labor market has a moni-
toring employment equilibrium with a wage limiting to
wMθB =
1
2
[q − b− λc(1− θB)]− (1− θB)
2
λ
q
2r
. (2.13)
Proposition 4. This equilibrium is unique.
Note that since in order not to reveal his type, a β-worker has to bargain as type
α, he acts as though the probability of promotion is 1 even though the firm treats him
as being of average type θB. If the worker were truly a “type θB,” with probability of
matching well of θB, known to be one and bargained as one, the Rubinstein bargaining
solution would substitute the value of unemployment as a θB for q/r in the final term.
Instead, the firm here extracts additional surplus over the baseline of a “θB” type; as
∆ ↓ 0 this limits to .5(1− θB)λ(.5q−UθB), the ‘pooling penalty’.25 Type αs are hurt
by pooling with βs not only because of the pooling penalty but also because the firm
underestimates their output by λc(1− θB).
As the equilibrium strategies induce full monitoring, employees who are revealed
25The Pooling Penalty is always positive as the unemployment value of the worker is never higher
than the payoff to matching well.
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to be in bad matches separate from the firm. This sends only β workers back into
the job-seeking pool, churning the market quality to θB.
2.5 Implications for Labor Markets
The previous sections establish conditions under which there are two distinct steady-
states of the labor market. In this section, we compare labor market outcomes for
workers in these steady states. Our comparative statics are performed in the limit as
the bargaining delay goes to 0.
2.5.1 Employment Duration
Absent monitoring, there is no new information to dissolve the match. Therefore,
taken literally, the model implies no turnover in the white equilibrium. In contrast,
with monitoring, some workers prove ill-suited for the job and return to the unem-
ployment pool. We interpret this as predicting that black workers will have lower
average employment duration. Recall that workers who return to the unemployment
pool are all type β. Therefore, turnover is even higher than if only new entrants were
monitored.
The model, again taken literally, implies that the separation hazard for blacks is
ht =
(1− β) (1− g)λe−λt
1− (1− β) (1− g) e−λt (2.14)
which is decreasing in t. We expect the prediction that the exit hazard into unemploy-
ment should decline more rapidly for blacks than for whites is robust to consideration
of important real world elements not addressed by the model. Unfortunately, all the
estimates of this hazard by race that we have been able to find assume a constant
hazard. The closest result we know of is Bowlus and Seitz (2000) who find that this
hazard is much higher for young blacks than for young whites but that this differ-
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ence disappears among older workers, a finding consistent with our model but that
nevertheless does not directly measure the relations between hazards and seniority.
As our model abstracts from firm-to-firm hiring, we have no prediction with re-
gards to it. Although it may seem that firms would be out to poach black workers
with high seniority (that are likely to have passed monitoring), adverse selection
effects (with the worst workers more willing to leave) could unravel such effects, de-
pending on the ability of outside employers to commit. Still, our predictions are in
terms of employment, not job, duration.
2.5.2 Persistence of Discrimination
A key result of the churning mechanism in this paper is that deleterious steady states
are persistent. In this section we show just how hard it is to transition to a good
steady state. We regard this as illustrating the difficulty of addressing labor market
discrimination in the context of policy, particularly policy aimed at improving the
skills of black workers. The existence of a range of g values for which both equilibria
exist allows us to talk about persistence of the deleterious equilibrium.
Heretofore we have assumed that average skill levels for the two population groups
are identical. Suppose instead that skill levels are gB 6= gW and the initial equilibrium
has monitoring of blacks but not whites. Monitoring will persist as the equilibrium in
the black labor market until gB rises above some critical level while the no monitoring
equilibrium will persist in the white market provided that gW remains above a lower
critical level. In principle, we can have the black workers in the bad equilibrium and
the white workers in the good equilibrium provided that (C4) is satisfied and
gB ≤ gW
β + (1− β) gW . (2.15)
To set ideas, suppose that gW and β both equal .5, then we could observe the black
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workers in the bad equilibrium if gB is as large as 2/3. In short, not only may
discriminatory markets persist when skill levels for whites and blacks are identical,
but they may persist even when black skill levels are significantly higher. Policy aimed
at accomplishing convergence of labor market outcomes via changes in population skill
may fail to clear the hurdle of inertia.
2.5.3 Wages
Wages are lower for black workers at the point of hiring. Not only do they pay a
share of the monitoring cost, they also pay what we dubbed the Pooling Penalty. In
addition, each type expects lower lifetime earnings than its white counterpart. To see
this, consider the following:
(i) Rearranging (C4), we have that the payoff to αs is higher in the unchurned
market for a no-monitoring strategy:
q − λc(1− θW )
2r
>
q − λc(1− θW )− b+ λ(1 + θW ) q2r
2(r + λ)
. (2.16)
But as the right-hand side of that inequality is increasing in θ, we further have
q − λc(1− θW )− b+ λ(1 + θW ) q2r
2(r + λ)
>
q − λc(1− θB)− b+ λ(1 + θB) q2r
2(r + λ)
(2.17)
and therefore
q − λc(1− θW )
2r
>
q − λc(1− θB)− b+ λ(1 + θB) q2r
2(r + λ)
, (2.18)
which implies that white αs have a higher ex-ante payoff compared to their
black counterparts. As all worker payoff derives from wages, this means that
lifetime wages are lower for black α workers.
(ii) On the other hand, white α and β workers expect the same lifetime wages. Since
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β workers value monitoring strictly less than α workers and black α workers are
worse off than white ones, black β workers must expect lower lifetime wages
than their white counterparts.
Significantly, the model predicts that the realized strategies produce payoffs that
maximize the joint surplus of αs and θ-belief firms. This implies that as a function
of market θ, payoff to newly matched firms and type α workers is continuous, being
an upper envelope of linear functions. However, the strategy shift produces a jump
discontinuity in the payoff to β types forced to follow suit. Figure 2 illustrates this
jump.26
Figure 2·2: Equilibrium α and β payoffs as a function of average hire
quality θ.
26Figure 2, and this discussion, only concern expected lifetime payoff starting at a new job. As
time goes to infinity, any single black worker will eventually be revealed good at a match and will
therefore receive a better wage than white workers. We don’t dwell on this issue as it is an artefact
of the irrelevance of the outside option (much lower for black workers) in our particular bargaining
model and the perfectly revealing nature of the monitoring technology. An alternate ultimate fate
for workers is discussed in the model variant of section 2.5.5, where unlucky black workers can get
stuck in low-wage jobs.
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In a sense, because of the sharp discontinuity in the earnings of βs, the model
predicts that the return to skill is higher for blacks than for whites, consistent with
the empirical findings in Neal and Johnson (1996) and Lang and Manove (2011).
We are reluctant to push this point strongly because the evidence concerns either
observable ability in the form of education or potentially observable ability in the form
of performance on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test. In section 2.5.5 we consider
the case of observable investments.
The model has no role for human capital acquisition although below we briefly
discuss the possibility that workers invest in human capital before they enter the
labor market. Since there is no post-employment investment in the model, condi-
tional on seniority, there is no return to experience for either blacks or whites. Since
blacks spend more time unemployed, we might expect that, once we allow for such
investments, the return to potential experience would be higher for whites, at least
conditional on seniority. On the other hand, since the probability that blacks, but
not whites, are well-matched to their jobs increases with job duration (through the
selection effect), if we do not condition on seniority, this will tend to give blacks a
higher return to potential experience.
But even this ignores the potential complementarity between match quality and
human capital investment. On the one hand, firms are less likely to invest in workers
whom they believe may be badly matched. On the other hand, they may be more
(or less) likely to invest in black workers who have been revealed to be a good match
than in white workers whose match quality is unknown and will not be revealed.
As a consequence of these considerations, we do not view the predictions regarding
the differing effects of seniority and experience on the wages of blacks and whites to
be robust. This is less disturbing than it could have been since we interpret the
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empirical literature on this issue as fairly mixed.27
2.5.4 Unemployment Duration
We have so far treated the workers’ matching rate, µ, as exogenous. Making the
standard assumption of free entry, we now allow firms to post and maintain vacancies
at a cost k per unit time. When a firm creates a vacancy, it can direct its search. This
can take several forms, most notably locating production operations in an area with
specific population characteristics or advertising the vacancy in different areas and
through different media. In general, a firm can target markets indexed by i where a
proportion ρi of unemployed workers are white. The open vacancy cost k is invariant
to this target choice. We assume that in each market i the bargaining equilibria and
population group steady states break down along the discriminatory lines described
so far.
Define φ as market tightness and let the worker job-finding rate function follow
the commonly assumed form
µ(φ) = mφγ (2.19)
for constants m > 0 and 0 < γ < 1. Note that if firms expect a match to be worth
V , the free-entry level of φ in such a market sets
µ(φ)
φ
V − k = 0. (2.20)
So
φ = (
V m
k
)
1
1−γ . (2.21)
27Monk (2000) finds that the experience effect on wages for blacks exceeds that for whites until
roughly fifteen years of experience while the seniority effect is larger for whites through thirteen years
of seniority. Bronars and Famulari (1997) also find that the black-white wage differential tends to
fall with experience. On the other hand, D’Amico and Maxwell (1994) find that the gap between
blacks and whites widens with experience, a result that Altonji and Blank (1999) view as confirming
earlier work.
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Therefore, φ is an increasing function of V .
Assuming that (C6) and (C7) hold for the entire breadth of derived matching
rates, we can now derive the free-entry equilibrium level of µρi for each market i. The
payoff to a firm for matching is the same as for an α worker, that is, when hiring
from pool i, the firm expects a successful match to pay
Vi = ρi
q − λc(1− θW )
2r
+ (1− ρi)
q − λc(1− θB)− b+ λ(1 + θB) q2r
2(r + λ)
. (2.22)
Since the payoff to white α workers is higher than for blacks, the expression above
is increasing in ρi. Therefore, markets with more black workers will have a lower
expected payoff for a filled vacancy. Therefore, the free-entry φ(ρi) and µ(φ(ρi)) are
increasing in ρi. As average unemployment duration is
1
µ
, this implies that markets
with higher black concentration will experience higher average unemployment duration.
In the extreme case where markets are fully segregated, that is ρi ∈ {0, 1}, we can
derive the ratio of the matching rates in the two markets:
µ(φ(0))
µ(φ(1)
=
(
q − λc(1− θB)− b+ λ(1 + θB) q2r
q − λc(1− θW )
r
r + λ
) γ
1−γ
< 1. (2.23)
2.5.5 Extensions
Eventual revelation in all matches
We have assumed unrealistically that the match quality of workers who are not mon-
itored is never revealed. More plausibly, heightened scrutiny speeds the rate at which
match quality is revealed. In a model in which workers live forever, this change con-
sidered in isolation would eliminate our result because the composition of the jobless
pool is independent of the rate at which bad matches are revealed. However, if work-
ers do not live forever, then reducing the rate at which match quality is revealed does
affect the quality of the unemployment pool, and our basic results go through.
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Skill level and discrimination
Further, we can allow for observable heterogeneity among workers. If there are groups
of workers for whom g is high, only the no-monitoring equilibrium will exist for these
groups, regardless of race. This is also true at very low g and very low β (although
we have assumed away this case to simplify the proofs). The first result is consistent
with similar outcomes for blacks and whites with high levels of skill as measured by
education or the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Lang and
Manove, 2011). The latter is consistent with some evidence that the bottom of the
labor market is similarly bad for blacks and whites. On the other hand, Lang and
Manove find that the market learns the productivity of white but not black high
school dropouts. This is consistent with an equilibrium in which white dropouts
are, on average, more skilled than black dropouts and therefore in which white but
not black dropouts are monitored. Nevertheless, without additional, largely ad hoc
assumptions, this story cannot account for the very high unemployment rate among
black dropouts.
Investment in unobservable skills
We have heretofore postulated that the proportion of α types is exogenous. Assume
instead that some fraction of workers are innately of type α. Others can transform
themselves from βs into αs at some cost ω with cdf F (ω) . Provided that the fraction
of natural αs satisfies (C4) and (C5), both equilibria will continue to exist. However,
since in the no-monitoring equilibrium αs and βs receive the same wage, there is
no incentive to invest in becoming an α. In contrast, in the monitoring equilibrium,
lifetime earnings are strictly higher for αs than for βs. Thus, some individuals will
have an incentive to make the investment.28 This prediction contrasts with Coate
28It might appear that the incentive to undertake such investments would unravel the monitored
equilibrium. However, if this were the case, no worker would have an incentive to invest. This raises
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and Loury (1993), where black workers are less willing to invest in skills.
Education
Suppose now that there exists a signal,29 which we identify with education, that α
workers can purchase at some personal cost κ ∼ F (κ). Assume doing so assures that
any employer will be immediately aware that the worker is indeed type α. A worker of
either population will then anticipate a lifetime utility of VEduc(κ) = µq/ (2r (µ+ r))−
κ. In Section 2.5.3 we showed that unrevealed white α workers receive a higher lifetime
payoff than their black counterparts; therefore, the incentive for the latter to invest in
education is greater. As this implies that κW ≡ max{κ : VEduc(κ) ≥ V αW} < max{κ :
VEduc(κ) ≥ V αB } ≡ κB, we must have that F (κW ) < F (κB) and therefore more black
workers will purchase education. In particular, there exists some range of idiosyncratic
costs for which black workers will purchase education but white workers will not. This
is consistent with the finding in Lang and Manove (2011) that, conditional on past
test scores, blacks get more education than whites do. The intuition here is simple;
if a worker of high skill is treated as if she has the average hire’s skill for her group,
she has a greater incentive to reveal her high skill if that average is lower.30
Perhaps equally importantly, this extension suggests that blacks and whites with
high observable skills will have similar outcomes as discussed in the previous subsub-
section.
messy dynamic issues which we sidestep by assuming that the fraction of additional workers who
would choose to invest is insufficient to overturn (C5).
29We analyze the case of a pure signal. If education can also turn a β into an α, the analysis is
a combination of the anlysis in this and the prior subsection since productive investment increases
the fraction of workers who are α but investment that reveals workers to be α reduces the fraction
of unrevealed workers who are α.
30Strictly speaking, this creates a feedback loop from lower wages for the uneducated to a greater
measure of education. The right assumptions on F rule out associated complexities.
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Imperfect monitoring
Reader may have noted that the intuitive example presented first is distinct from
the main model where monitoring resolves all uncertainty about worker type. As
the example demonstrates, one can write a very similar model in which β workers
always match badly but monitoring can result in false positive good matches. Given
a wage-determination mechanism with outcomes similar to our bargaining protocol,
much of the analysis would remain unchanged.31 Parameters would exist that would
force monitoring on blacks but not whites, the black labor market would churn, and
it would produce higher unemployment duration and lower lifetime wages for blacks.
In this formulation, black workers succeeding at monitoring would only be as good as
whites who had never been monitored; therefore a churned market does not necessarily
produce better long-run matches or higher wages for the successfully monitored.
However, this alternate model would imply that some workers are purely parasitic
and cannot be matched well, but rather aspire simply to find a job where their lack
of productivity is undiscovered. An equivalent of (C6) cannot hold here and as a
result we cannot rule out equilibria where negotiations sometimes break down and
separation occurs without monitoring producing information.
Stigma and degeneration into lower-skilled jobs
Our model unrealistically assumes that employers have no information regarding the
time that workers have been in the labor market or the number of jobs they have
held. If the other aspects of our model were a rough representation of reality, it is
implausible that firms would not recognize that some workers were unlikely to be
new entrants and therefore very likely to β types. Suppose also that if a worker is
31Unfortunately, this alternate model would add a lot of complexity and require additional assump-
tions for uniqueness, due to the lack of a single posterior following successful monitoring. Bargaining
strategies would have a much more tangled relation to beliefs and wages, and S3 would not be an
apt tool to facilitate the task.
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sufficiently likely to be a β, it is not efficient to employ or monitor him. Then workers
who do not find a good match sufficiently quickly will be permanently barred from
the monitoring sector.
Somewhat more formally, as an extension to the model, we can relax the as-
sumption that past history is entirely unobservable. Assume instead that each sep-
aration has a probability ζ of becoming public common knowledge. Any worker
who has a revealed separation is known to be of type β in any new match. Thus,
a newly hired worker who does not have such a stigma will be of average quality
θ′B = [β + gζ(1− β)] / [gβ + (1− g) + gζ(1− β)]. If we assume θ′B satisfies (C5),
churning can persist but will be primarily a phenomenon for relatively young work-
ers.
But what will happen to workers revealed to be βs? It is straightforward to
extend the model to allow for a second occupation type (q′, c′) lacking monitoring
technology32 that is less skill intensive than the task described so far, i.e. q > q′ and
q−λc < q′−λc′. As unrevealed β types are strictly better off than revealed ones in a
new match of the first task, there must be q′, c′ such that the revealed β types prefer
to enter the job market for the second occupation but the unrevealed ones do not.
In this scenario, a fraction of black workers are relegated to low-wage jobs while
white workers with similar skills can always get better jobs. Furthermore, since the
low-wage jobs are not monitored, they are a terminal state, with no possibility of
promotion or escape.
Changing screening and monitoring technology
Autor and Scarborough (2008) examine the effect of bringing in a new screening
process. They find that the screening process raised the employment duration of both
32Or, more palatably, the same technology but without the incentives to use it, as in the case of
a small enough c′.
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black and white workers with no noticeable effect on minority hiring. In our model, we
can think of this technology as allowing the firm to screen for job match quality prior
to employment. This increases the proportion of hired blacks who become permanent
workers since some bad matches are not hired. If the screening mechanism is good
enough, the firm will choose not to monitor the black workers it hires, and all black
workers will be permanent. Formally, since all white workers are permanent in the
absence of the screen, the screen does not affect this proportion. Informally, if poor
matches are more likely to depart even without monitoring, then there will also be
positive effects on white employment duration.33 Similarly, Wozniak (2015) shows
that drug testing increases black employment and reduces the wage gap; we interpret
this as confirming evidence for the notion that employers are more uncertain about
the quality of black workers, and therefore that black workers benefit more from early
resolution of such uncertainty.34
We note that improved technology appears to have reduced monitoring costs.
This is unambiguously good for blacks who share the cost of being monitored. Unless
the reduction shifts whites into the monitoring equilibrium, they are unaffected by
the cost reduction. However, if firms begin monitoring, α workers and the firm will
initially be better off. On the other hand, β workers will generally be worse off as they
will not be able to oppose the use of monitoring without revealing themselves. In a
collective bargaining setting, the union might resist monitoring. The more interesting
point is that since monitoring creates an externality, it is easy to develop an example
in which monitoring makes both types of workers and capital worse off in the long
run.35
33Formally, the model would have to be modified to ensure that some β workers are never perfectly
matched and/or that some β workers are still in bad matches when they exit the labor force.
34Wozniak (2015) is not to be interpreted as evidence that monitoring is good for black workers on
the aggregate. As in the present paper, it can beneficial on an individual level; our model, however,
shows it can also create a worse externality.
35Suppose that g0 is just sufficient to sustain a no-monitoring equilibrium. A small reduction in
b puts the labor market into a monitoring equilibrium. If there were no subsequent churning, α
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2.5.6 Additional Empirical Content
This paper’s aim is to explain the employment duration differential; its chief extra
predictions are longer unemployment duration and lower lifetime income for black
workers. In the interest of falsifiability, we posit here additional empirical implications
that we view as following from our explanatory hypothesis and are relatively model-
free.
We expect that when jobs vary with respect to the cost or accuracy of monitoring
technology, black workers would skew more heavily towards those that favor moni-
toring. If the firm’s cost of monitoring is lower, the initial match surplus with black
workers is greater with benefits split between higher initial wages and lower labor
costs. If the monitoring is faster at a firm,36 α workers can reveal their ability and
reap better wages sooner, while the firm will keep bad matches for less time. Either
case produces a comparative advantage for this firm in hiring black workers. Jobs
with high monitoring potential could for example be recording employee-customer
interactions, as incoming call centers do.
Our explanation for lower black employment duration involves learning about
match quality. In our model, the separation hazard into unemployment at time t is
ht = (1 − θB)λe−λt/
(
θB + (1− θB)e−λt
)
for black workers and, rather starkly, 0 for
white workers. More realistically, we expect the gap in the hazard rate to be declining
in seniority.
2.6 Example
Here we provide a simple numerical example satisfying our conditions.
workers and firms would experience a slight gain, but the churning will wipe this out and more.
Firms always make zero profit on vacancies, but if we allow for a distribution of vacancy costs, then
the rents earned by firms with low costs of creating vacancies will also fall.
36while keeping type productivity constant; that is, the firm has λ′ > λ and λ′c′ = λc.
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Take r = .05, suggesting a unit of time of about a year. λ = 2 so that the average
unsuccessful job lasts six months. β = .2 and g = .95 , implying that most workers are
good matches. c = .5 and q = 1 so that bad matches produce expected flow output
of 0, making separation efficient regardless of unemployment duration. Finally, b = 1
so that b/λ = 1/2, making the expected cost of monitoring roughly equal to the value
of six months of output from a well-matched worker.
It is readily verified numerically that the numerical conditions old.
These parameters result in a θW of .96 and churning produces a θB of .833. The
value of a filled vacancy in the white market is 9.6 and in the black labor market 8.9.
Postulating a Cobb-Douglas matching function with elasticity η = .75, the model
predicts a black-white unemployment duration ratio of 1.25. We can now compute
the ratio of white to black income PDV at birth to be 1.11.
This example illustrates that a churning equilibrium is possible even if the pro-
portion of type β workers is quite low in the population, and can generate reasonable
income and unemployment disparities while doing so; one would do well to bear
in mind, however, that our model applies conditional on observables and therefore
cannot be calibrated to make economy-wide predictions.
2.7 Conclusions
We have developed a model that explains the black-white employment duration differ-
ential, and in the process have uncovered a mechanism that both reproduces standard
empirical findings and makes novel predictions.
Our model in some ways resembles models of adverse selection in the labor market.
Displaced workers are worse, on average, than a randomly selected worker. However,
in contrast with standard adverse selection models, firms cannot distinguish between
displaced workers and other unemployed workers. Therefore displaced workers depress
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the wage of all unemployed workers. At the same time, our approach does not generate
the asymmetry of information among firms that drives adverse selection models. If
the worker is known to be good at a particular job, he will not leave for another job
even if he knows that, on average, he will be good at other jobs. If the worker is bad
at this particular job, he separates immediately.
To keep the analysis simple, our model assumes that workers who turn out to be
well-matched remain employed forever. At first blush, this suggests that it applies
only to new entrant unemployment because the market will surely recognize that a
fifty-year old worker is not a new entrant. We believe it is more realistic to assume that
the market cannot tell whether a fifty-year old worker who was laid-off six months ago
has just been unlucky and not had any matches or has had a match that turned out
to be bad. The market often cannot tell how long the worker has been unemployed.
Thus we think the model is more general. In addition, it provides some insight into
the scarring effect of unemployment.
Unlike most, perhaps all, existing models, ours can explain a number of empirical
regularities regarding discrimination simultaneously:
1. Black workers have shorter employment durations.
2. Black workers have longer unemployment durations.
3. Black workers have lower lifetime earnings.
As written, the model has infinitely lived matches and agents so there is no unem-
ployment rate. Allowing for deaths, we would have well-defined unemployment rates
and would predict the rate for black workers is higher.
More generally, we view the main message of this paper as robust to many of the
modeling decisions. The key element is that blacks are subject to more scrutiny or
to a higher standard than white workers. This leads to more blacks being returned
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to the unemployment pool, lowering the quality of that pool and, completing the
equilibrium, making tougher scrutiny optimal.
Our model also strongly suggests that history matters and that equality of oppor-
tunity is not enough to eliminate racial disparities in the labor market even if this
concept is used very expansively. The fact that blacks historically had low skills leads
to an equilibrium in which the pool of black job seekers has lower skills than the pool
of white job seekers even when the distribution of skills among all workers is identical
for blacks and whites. While, over time, a human capital-based policy could mitigate
labor market discrimination, achieving equality in human capital may be insufficient
to eliminate racial disparities in the labor market.
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Chapter 3
An Impossibility Theorem in
Repeated Games (with Sambuddha
Ghosh)
3.1 Introduction
Repeated games provide the standard model to show when and how concerns about
the future of a repeated interaction can overcome myopic incentives to cheat. The
canonical model with perfect monitoring is well studied. It involves a finite number of
players choosing simultaneously from finite actions spaces; actions are revealed at the
end of the period; total payoffs are defined as the discounted sum of the period payoffs.
Perhaps best known among the repeated games results are the so-called folk theorems,
which pin down the set of equilibrium payoff vectors as the common discount factor
converges to unity (equivalently, the discount rate goes to zero). Friedman (1971)
uses reversion to Nash equilibrium to produce ‘trigger strategies’ that form equilibria
at any discount factor great enough. Such strategies can deliver any feasible average
payoff better than some stage-game Nash equilibrium for each player. The first com-
prehensive folk theorem is that of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), henceforth FM: Any
payoff profile that is feasible and strictly individual rational (henceforth FSIR) in the
67
stage-game is the average discounted payoff of a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) of the infinitely repeated game if each player is sufficiently patient; from the
best response property inherent in any Nash equilibrium it is clear that one cannot
get strictly lower payoffs, which justifies the label ‘comprehensive’.
It is usual to assume in repeated games that the exact discount factors are known
to all players and to the game theorist. In reality the game theorist who recommends
a course of action, for example by designing mechanisms for repeated auctions, might
not know the discount factor of the players exactly. If strategies are very sensitive to
discount factors, small amounts of ignorance can have dramatic effects. Indeed, one
can also imagine that in real life players themselves cannot be certain that the others
discount the future in exactly the same way as they do.
Kalai and Stanford (1988) provides a notion of discount robustness that is of use to
us: strategy profiles form a Discount Robust Subgame Perfect (DRSP) equilibrium of
a game if they are also an equilibrium of the same game with ever so slightly different
discount factors. This is a local notion of robustness, which they show is useful in
proving several results. We will additionally be interested in a stronger notion, which
we dub Blackwell-Nash (BN) equilibrium, in which strategies are additionally required
to form an equilibrium if players had weakly greater discount factors than initially
supposed. This second notion allows a game theorist to design equilibrium strategies
if all she has available is a lower bound on each player’s discount factor.
Nash reversion, introduced in Friedman (1971), can give a folk theorem for BN
equilibria covering part of the feasible set. However, folk theorems such as the one
in FM that cover the entire FSIR set preclude deviations from equilibrium by postu-
lating severe punishments off-path. In particular, deviating players are subjected to
‘minmaxing’, multiple periods where they are given their worst possible individually
rational payoff. The players executing the punishment are then rewarded, in part for
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their mixing over actions that may offer varied stage-game payoffs in the punishment
phase; they are rewarded more for using actions that give them less immediate payoff.
Such rewards would be impossible to calibrate if the discount factor of each player was
not precisely known. One may think, then, that as the strategies sketched by these
folk theorems were not designed with discount robustness in mind, an alternative
technique could support payoffs in the whole of the FSIR robustly.
This paper establishes that this is not, in general, the case. We prove a negative
result, showing the existence of a critical point in the FSIR, so that points not in the
positive orthant defined by it cannot be robustly supported under either notion of
robustness. That is to say, our impossibility theorem shows that not only do current
techniques fail to construct such strategies, but that such strategies cannot ever be
constructed.
Having precluded robust equilibria in a region of the FSIR, we then set out to
salvage the rest of the FSIR. We show that payoffs in (the interior of) the complement
of the excluded region can always be supported robustly, with respect to both notions.
In particular, we prove a discount-robustness folk theorem: for each such payoff, if
players are sufficiently patient, there exist equilibrium strategies that provide that
payoff that are robust to discount vectors, both locally and to all weakly greater
ones.
It is perhaps surprising that although we are using two nested robustness concepts,
the regions of the FSIR over which they can hold are the same. However, the two
concepts share an important commonality: both require robustness to an uncountable
set of discount vectors. The intuition for our results lies with the ability to calibrate
punishments for deviations. If players’ discount factors are fixed, players participating
in the punishment of another can later be rewarded for mixing between actions that
do not give the same stage-game payoff. However, if the discount factors may vary
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over an uncountable set, it is not possible to keep indifference under all possibilities.
Therefore, certain kinds of punishments are impossible; as players will not accept
payoffs that are not supported by worse punishments, they cannot get such payoffs
in equilibrium. We thus show that the ability to punish, developed for (constructive)
folk theorems, can therefore be thought of as a necessary condition, not merely a
sufficient one, in thinking about payoffs feasible in equilibrium.
3.2 Preliminaries
We consider a standard infinitely repeated game with perfect monitoring and possibly
unequal discounting. At each t ∈ Z+ the (finite) stage-game G = 〈I; (Ai)i; (gi)i〉 is
played, where I is the set of players {1, . . . , n}, Ai is player i’s finite set of actions,
A := ×i∈IAi is the set of all pure action profiles, and gi : A → R is player i’s payoff
function. A mixed action of i is αi ∈ 4Ai, where 4E is the set of all probability
distributions on a set E. Let a(t) ∈ A be the (realized) action profile played at time
t.1 When player i discounts future payoffs using the discount factor δi, player i’s
average discounted utility defined over infinite sequences of pure actions in A is
ui(
{
a(t)
}∞
t=0
) := (1− δi)
∞∑
t=0
δi
tgi
(
a(t)
)
.
Under perfect monitoring the public history at the end of period t is
ht = (a(0), . . . ,a(t)) ∈ At+1 (starting with the empty history h−1). A pure strategy
of i is si(t + 1) : H
t → Ai (for t = −1, 0, 1, . . .) where H t denotes the set of histories
at the end of period t; mixed strategies are analogous, except that they map to the
corresponding mixed actions 4Ai. We also allow strategies to be conditioned on
1In what follows vectors are boldfaced while scalars and sets are not. Sequence indices are denoted
by superscripts and sometimes they are enclosed in parentheses to distinguish them from exponents
or from another sequence denoted by the same letter; for example, cl denotes the l-th vertex of a
polytope C, while {c(t)} denotes an infinite sequence of vertices each element of which is a cl for
some l. Coordinates of vectors are denoted by subscripts.
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the realization of a publicly observable random variable (henceforth PRD), but do
not explicitly model it. This describes the repeated game G∞(δ), where the vector
δ = (δ1, . . . , δn) is referred to as the discount factor vector. In the special case where
each player discounts the future at the rate δ, we obtain the game G∞(δ).
Player i’s minmax value is
wi := min
α−i∈×j(∆Aj)
max
ai
gi(ai,α−i),
while her pure-action minmax value is
wpi := min
a−i∈A−i
max
ai
gi(ai,α−i).
Let mi ∈ ×j(∆Aj) be a strategy profile that minmaxes i, with player i playing a
best response; for the pure minmax case we define the corresponding action profile
as mp,i ∈ A. The feasible set is the convex hull of the set of pure-action stage-game
payoffs, F := co(g(A)), and the feasible strictly individually rational (FSIR) set is
F ∗ := {x ∈ F |xi > wi}; by analogy with it we can define F p := {x ∈ F |xi > wpi }.
The lower boundary of F is ∂F := {x ∈ F : @y ∈ F such that y << x}.
FM shows that for any v ∈ F ∗\∂F there exists a δ ∈ (0, 1) such that if the common
discount factor δ satisfies δ > δ, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (σi)i∈I
of G∞(δ) such that for each i ∈ I, player i’s payoff is vi.2
3.3 Discount Robustness
Folk theorems provide a surprisingly large set of possible equilibrium payoffs. Moti-
vated by this, a variety of later work first questions and then proves the robustness
of the folk theorem to a variety of alternative assumptions.
In this work, we ask to what extent payoffs in F ∗ can be supported by strategies
2This result is extended to ∂F in Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1991).
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that form equilibria not at just a single discount vector, but rather a suitably larger
set. However, it is not obvious what definition of robustness is appropriate. We will
use two such definitions — one weak, and one strong. We borrow the first definition
from Kalai and Stanford (1988).
Definition 1. [Kalai and Stanford (1988)] A Discount Robust Subgame Perfect
(DRSP) equilibrium of G∞(δ) is a strategy profile σ such that there exists a neigh-
borhood B of δ for which if δ′ ∈ B then σ is an SPNE strategy profile of the game
G∞(δ′).
Intuitively, this is a weak ‘local’ notion as it requires equilibrium strategies of
the game G∞(δ) to remain equilibria if the discount factor is close enough to δ. In
Kalai and Stanford (1988) it is shown that if a unique stage-game best response
to opponents’ pure actions always exists, then a pure-strategy DRSP equilibrium
involves each player playing a unique best-response strategy to opponent strategies.3
However, one may desire, in the spirit of the folk theorems, robustness to not just
nearby discounting factors but all higher discount factors. This leads to the following
concept, first formally introduced in Dasgupta and Ghosh (2015).4
Definition 2. A Blackwell-Nash (BN) equilibrium of G∞(δ) is a strategy profile σ
such that there exists a δ << δ with the property that if δ′ >> δ then σ is a SPNE
of G∞(δ′).
This is a natural multi-player version of the single-player notion from dynamic
programming, where a player’s strategy in a dynamic choice problem is said to be
Blackwell optimal if there exists a cutoff such that it is optimal for the single player
to follow the strategy when the discount factor of the player exceeds the cutoff. If
3In fact, this proposition is proven using a corollary of the same power-series result we will use
to prove one of our theorems.
4The word ‘formally’ is far from redundant. During a conversation at Yale, Ghosh had asserted
that the equilibria constructed in Dasgupta and Ghosh (2015) had the merit of not needing to be
fine-tuned, being robust to small variations in discount factors. This led Johannes Ho¨rner to verbally
propose to Ghosh the notion of Blackwell-Nash equilibrium.
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the game theorist knows that each player’s discount factor exceeds a critical value,
she can design strategy profiles from which no player would want to deviate. This
is the sort of robustness of Friedman (1971)’s folk theorem. A BN equilibrium not
only provides local robustness near δ but also to higher discount factors for each
player, that is, it remains an equilibrium for all δ′i ∈ [δi, 1). Clearly, a BN equilibrium
strategy profile is also a DRSP equilibrium strategy profile, but the reverse need not
be true.
Our main question is to what extent is each payoff v in F ∗ obtainable in DRSP/BN
equilibria of G∞(δ) for sufficiently large δ? Surprisingly, despite the use of nested
notions of robustness, the answers to these two questions coincide.
The key to our results is that these questions turn on whether or not players need
future incentives to randomize. Recall from Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) that the
issue of punishments becomes relevant only when it comes to punishing a player for
a deviation. If players are asked to mix over actions that will give them the same
stage-game payoff, given opponents’ current actions, and future play is independent
of which pure action is played, players are willing to mix. On the other hand, if
players are to mix among actions that give them different current payoffs, they must
be compensated later for taking a worse action today. This is easy enough if the
discount factor is known,5 but it is harder to do so for multiple discount factors. In
fact, we show that when the set of potential discount factors is uncountable, which
is required for both DRSP and BN, it is impossible to calibrate such rewards to keep
the player indifferent no matter what her discount factor is.
Motivated by the above, it is clear that payoff vectors fall into one of two types,
those that can be given by equilibrium strategies without mixing over actions giving
different myopic payoffs, and those that can not be. If player i is to get payoff vi
in a SPNE, it must be the case that she is unable to myopically best-respond to
5See, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
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opponents’ stage-game actions and do better. But if randomization can only be
used when myopically indifferent, opponent actions are restricted. For instance, it
may be impossible to incentivize i’s opponents to minmax player i and give her the
standard minmax wi. With a limited potential to punish in either kind of discount-
robust equilibrium, it should come as no surprise that not all of F ∗ remains incentive
compatible.
3.3.1 The restricted minmax
To proceed along these lines, we must find the worst punishments that can be delivered
with robustness to discount factors. To that end, we first need to define the set of
action profiles where mixing does not require future rewards to generate indifference.
If the action profile α is to make players myopically indifferent, each αi should involve
mixing only over elements in Ai that give the same payoff to i given α−i; that is,
Definition 3. An action profile α for stage-game G has the myopic indifference
property if for each player i we have ai, a
′
i ∈ supp(αi)⇒ gi(ai, α−i) = gi(a′i, α−i).
Let Q ⊂ ×i4Ai denote the set of all action profiles with the myopic indifference
property. All pure action profiles trivially satisfy the definition. Nash equilibria of
G also have the myopic indifference property as they specify actions that give the
same (maximum) payoff given other players’ actions. In fact, one way to conceive of
Q is as the collected Nash equilibria of the family of stage games with pure action
sets {A′|A′ = ×iA′i, A′i ⊂ Ai}. That is, if α ∈ Q, we can modify G into some G′ by
removing pure actions in such a way that α is a Nash equilibrium of G′.
We define player i’s restricted minmax (payoff) as
ri = min
α∈Q
max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai,α−i) (3.1)
That is, the restricted minmax for player i is the highest payoff she can get if other
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players are using the worst possible actions for her, with the added constraint that
those actions must form a myopically indifferent action profile when coupled with
some action αi for i. Notice that the action profile used to compute ri is not necessarily
myopically indifferent. Therefore it is both the case that ri is (weakly) higher than
the lowest payoff i attains in Q and (weakly) lower than the lowest payoff i attains
in Q when he is best responding.
Now, define
F res := {x ∈ F | x >> r}. (3.2)
As stated, pure actions profiles all trivially satisfy myopic indifference. Therefore
(with some abuse of notation) we have that
×i Ai ⊆ Q ⊆ ×i∆Ai (3.3)
and therefore that
min
a−i∈A−i
max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai,α−i) ≥ min
α∈Q
max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai,α−i) (3.4)
≥ min
α−i∈×j(∆Aj)
max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai,α−i) (3.5)
⇒ wpi ≥ ri ≥ wi. (3.6)
The reader may be interested in the question of whether both inequalities in (3.6) can
be strict at the same time; we provide an example where this is the case in Section
3.6. We are now prepared to present the paper’s main results.
3.4 An Impossibility Theorem
Our first main result is that if v 6∈ F res then v cannot be supported by DRSP
equilibrium strategies. Quite simply, if some player i were to get below her restricted
minmax payoff ri, she could do better by best-responding on a period-by-period
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basis; her opponents would not have a punishment apparatus available in a DRSP
equilibrium that is powerful enough to dissuade her.
Theorem 7. If v 6∈ F res, then @σ, δ such that σ is a DRSP equilibrium strategy
profile of G∞(δ) with equilibrium payoff vector v.
The impossibility theorem precludes the existence of a DRSP equilibrium with
payoff vector v 6∈ F res and therefore also disallows the existence of equilibria satis-
fying the stronger BN condition. Most surprisingly, the proof shows that if v is an
equilibrium payoff outside F res supported by some strategy profile σ, for any compact
set of discount factors D ⊂ (0, 1)n, only up to a finite subset of D can support σ as
an equilibrium strategy profile. As (0, 1)n can be written as the countable union of a
collection of its compact subsets, that means that only up to a countable set of dis-
count vectors can support σ, and those discount vectors form a totally disconnected
set. That is to say, if v 6∈ F res is delivered by an SPNE σ of G(δ), not only is there
no neighborhood of δ where σ remains an equilibrium, but there exist neighborhoods
of δ where σ is an equilibrium only at δ.
3.5 Blackwell-Nash Equilibrium Payoffs
We now ask what payoffs can be supported in Blackwell-Nash equilibria. Let F ∗p :=
{v ∈ F | vi > wpi ∀i}, where wpi is the pure strategy minmax, where players are
restricted to pure strategies. It should be clear that all such payoffs can be supported
in Blackwell-Nash equilibria exactly using the standard FM strategies; during the
punishment phase of i all other players pick mp,i ∈ A−i, the action profile against
which i’s best response gives her her pure minmax payoff wpi . Player j’s failure to
punish a deviator is immediately detected and met with punishment (pure minmax)
and forgone rewards for enforcing punishment.
Indeed one can do better. We show that all payoffs in F res may be obtained in
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BN equilibria and therefore in DRSP equilibria. In light of the impossibility result
presented above, this really is the best one could hope for. Perhaps counter-intuitively,
there is no region of the feasible set for which DRSP strategies can be constructed, but
BN strategies cannot; this is despite the fact that in general, equilibrium strategies
with the former property but not the latter exist. Note that as ×iAi ⊆ Q, the
theorem presented below can nest as a special case pure min-max punishment for
payoff vectors v >> wp.
The particular theorem presented makes use of a Public Randomization Device.
This allows on-path payoffs to be produced by an i.i.d. randomization over pure
actions for each player every period; hence, the ex-ante expected payoff for each
player in equilibrium will not depend on her discount factor. That is, not only does
the theorem deliver strategies that form a Blackwell-Nash equilibrium delivering v in
G∞(δ); they deliver v in G∞(δ′) for all δ′ ∈ [δ, 1)n as well. However, proving a BN-
robustness folk theorem for F res does not require a PRD. A version of this theorem
which constructs BN strategies delivering v in G∞(δ) and arbitrarily close to v in
G∞(δ′) for all δ′ ∈ [δ, 1)n and does not use a PRD is also possible.
The proof of the folk theorem presented here uses a construction based on the
simple strategy profiles of Abreu (1988). Following any deviation by a player i, con-
tinuation play is identical. Naively, one may think in analogy with minmax punish-
ments that a punishment is only feasible if the punishers are myopically indifferent on
the support of their actions when the punished player is myopically best-responding.
However, this is not the case. The key innovation in the proof is that if players
are convinced the target of their punishment will cooperate in the punishment rather
than play a myopic best-response, they can be induced to deliver harsher punishments
than otherwise. By then ensuring that cooperating in one’s punishment is preferable
to myopically best-responding, as the latter prolongs the punishment phase, we deter
77
such deviation from punishment. The punished player provides the punishing players
the incentives to punish, under threat that she will be required to do so for longer if
she deviates. In this way, the present theorem differs substantially from previous folk
theorems: the ability to incentivize the punishers and the punished is what restricts
the equilibrium payoff set.
Theorem 8. Let F be full-dimensional. Fix v ∈ F res and not on the lower boundary
of the set. There exists a cutoff discount factor δ and a strategy profile σ[v] such that
σ[v] is a Blackwell-Nash equilibrium of G∞(δ), with discounted average payoff v when
evaluated at δ ≥ δ.
Thus, with Theorem 7 precluding robust equilibria with payoffs outside F res and
Theorem 8 producing BN equilibria for all points of F res not on the lower boundary,
we have achieved a characterization of discount robust equilibrium payoffs (modulo
a set of measure zero).
Notice the strategies produced in Theorem 7 are invariant to the discount factors.
Unlike FM, we do not adjust payoffs in Phase III based on the actions taken in Phase
II. However, that adjustment was required in FM as they use ‘exact’ minimaxing.
Alternatively, Gossner (1995) shows that deviations may be deterred by schemes
with ‘approximate’ minmaxing. Such ‘codes of conduct’ specify on-path play exactly,
but allow strategies to vary in Phase II with the parameters of the model. In such a
way, one can give sharp descriptions of play in Phases I and III; play during Phase II
is left unspecified, but players compute a statistical test to determine whether they
have approximately minmaxed the deviator, and if not, whose punishment needs to
be triggered.
It should not come as a surprise that although robust equilibria for v ∈ F \ F res
do not exist, one can construct equilibria with payoffs v such that only off-path play
need vary with the discount factor. This further reinforces the basic intuition that
discount robustness has bite because it affects the ability to punish deviations.
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3.6 Example
This section provides an example game, for which we compare the feasible region F ∗
and the robustly feasible region F res. Consider the stage-game given by the following
payoff matrix.
Player 1
Player 2
L M R
T (5, 0) (0, 2) (5, 1)
D (0, 4) (0, 5) (6, 0)
B (8, 0) (6, 3) (0, 2)
Table 3.1: Example stage game G.
As player 2 has a strictly dominant strategy of the stage-game inM , it is easy to see
that her pure, restricted and mixed minmax values coincide at r2 = w2 = w
p
2 = 2 via
(T,M). For player 1, the pure minmax is wp1 = 6 and is achieved with either (B,M)
or (D,R). Her mixed minmax is w1 = 3 and given by (qD + (1 − q)B, 12M + 12R)
for any q ∈ [0, 1]. However, as M is a strictly dominant strategy in the stage-game,
player 2 will never be myopically indifferent between M and R. Therefore, player
1 can never be given such a low payoff in a BN equilibrium. Instead, the restricted
minmax involves player 2 mixing between L and R. A quick computation shows
that αi = (1
3
D + 2
3
B, qL + (1 − q)R), where q ∈ [1
6
, 5
8
]. Player 1’s best response to
(qL+ (1− q)R) is T , which would yield a payoff of 5, so r1 = 5.
Therefore, F ∗ = {x ∈ F |x >> (3, 2)} and F res = {x ∈ F |x >> (5, 2)}.The folk
theorem in FM implies that, for instance, v = (3, 4) can be delivered in an SPNE of
G∞(δ) for high enough δ, but Theorem 7 in this paper shows that no such SPNE is
discount-robust.
Figure 3·1 shows F , F ∗ and F res for game G. Although r1 = w2 means that the
minimum payoff for player 2 is the same in F res and F ∗, the fact that r1 > w1 limits
player 2’s maximum payoff in robust equilibria.
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Figure 3·1: The payoff space for game G. Starred region: payoffs that
can be delivered by a BN equilibrium. Hatched region: SPNEs exist,
but they are not robust.
3.7 Conclusion
We have shown that a sizable part of the FSIR, the set of payoffs proven to be equi-
librium payoffs in folk theorems, cannot be supported by discount-robust strategies.
Even a local notion of robustness is unattainable for equilibria with payoffs in that
region. However, we have shown in a robust folk theorem that the entire comple-
mentary payoff region can be supported by both locally and strongly discount-robust
equilibria. We do this by construction, designing simple strategy profiles that deliver
any point in the robust region.
Furthermore, in the course of addressing the robustness question, we discover a
new point of interest, the restricted minmax. We have shown that it describes the
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ability to punish when punishers’ incentives cannot be finely tuned via future rewards
for mixing. This intuition explains why certain regions of the payoff space cannot be
robustly attained, and additionally, how it is possible to construct equilibria in the
robustly feasible region.
Therefore, the present research establishes that care must be taken when discount
factors are not precisely known. While we present a tool to get around this problem,
it - and all other tools - may not always be applicable.
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Appendix A
Proofs of results in Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Recall the belief function pˆn that takes opponent type-wise acceptance probabilities
(Am)m6=n into the Bayesian posterior for a visitng applicant at firm n and the function
Aˆn that takes beliefs for firm n into optimal actions. The function Aˆn ◦ pˆn thus
takes opponent type-wise acceptance probabilities into (unique) optimal acceptance
probabilities for firm n and is therefore a best-response function. As the composition
of continuous functions, it is continuous. Forming the N -firm best response function
Aˆ ◦ pˆ : [0, 1]|Θ|N → [0, 1]|Θ|N using each firm’s best response functions, it inherits
continuity and is defined over a compact1, convex set. Therefore the Brouwer Fixed
Point Theorem gives us the existence of a fixed point in Aˆ ◦ pˆ and hence a Nash
Equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Once a firm acquires information, it will learn the applicant’s type and accept iff
θ > 0. Therefore, there are only three pure strategies and their mixtures to consider:
1To be precise, the initial action space is not necessarily compact; however, best responses always
fit Woodford (2008)’s description.
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staying uninformed (choosing signal gno, the completely uninformative signal struc-
ture) and rejecting all applicants, staying uninformed and accepting all applicants,
and becoming informed to accept iff θ > 0. Using formula (1.2) and noticing gno offers
no information and therefore H(pn) = H(pn(·|s)) when s is drawn according to gno,
it is the case that M(pn, gno) = 0. Therefore, remaining uninformed and rejecting the
applicant gives a payoff of 0. Accepting the applicant without information results in
a payoff of ∑
θ∈Θ
θpn(θ)− kM(pn, gno) =
∑
θ∈Θ
θpn(θ). (A.1)
Becoming informed by choosing gall (the completely informative signal structure)
eliminates all uncertainty in the posterior, and therefore H(pn(·|s)) = 0; therefore
M(pn, g) = H(pn) = −
∑
θ∈Θ pn(θ) ln pn(θ). Thus, becoming informed and accepting
iff θ > 0 results in a payoff of
∑
θ>0
θpn(θ)− kM(pn, gall) =
∑
θ>0
θpn(θ) + k
∑
θ∈Θ
pn(θ) ln pn(θ). (A.2)
First, suppose that the equilibrium belief for each firm n, pn, is equal to the prior
p0. Then, if (A.1) is greater than (A.2), as (1.9) implies that if ∀m 6= n,∀θ Am(θ) = 1,
and that in turn delivers that for each n, pˆn((Am)m 6=n) = p0. Therefore, we have an
equilibrium in pure strategies where ∀n, gn = gno and ∀s, an(s) = 1. That is, it is an
equilibrium that no firm becomes informed and all applicants are always accepted.
Otherwise, uninformed firms will reject the applicant. Each firm chooses a proba-
bility zn of becoming informed. The set of optimal information acquisition strategies,
as a function of pn, is therefore given by
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Zn(pn) =

{0} ∑θ>0 θpn(θ) + k∑θ∈Θ pn(θ) ln pn(θ) < 0
[0, 1]
∑
θ>0 θpn(θ) + k
∑
θ∈Θ pn(θ) ln pn(θ) = 0
{1} ∑θ>0 θpn(θ) + k∑θ∈Θ pn(θ) ln pn(θ) > 0
which is convex-valued and closed-graph.
Optimal actions following information acquisition for firm n satisfy ∀θ < 0, An(θ) =
0 and ∀θ > 0, An(θ) = zn. Thus, using (A.2) we can write the set of optimal strategies
in terms of Aˆn, a convex-valued, closed-graph correspondence in pn. Recall that pˆn
given by (1.9) is continuous. Therefore, Aˆn ◦ pˆn : [0, 1]N−1 → 2[0,1] mapping opponent
acceptance rates into optimal own acceptance rates is a best-response correspondence
for firm n and as a composition of a closed-graph, convex-valued correspondence on a
continuous function, in turn convex-valued and closed-graph. This property is inher-
ited by the N -firm best-response correspondence Aˆ◦ pˆ : [0, 1]N → 2[0,1]N and hence as
[0, 1]N is a compact, convex subset of RN , the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem applies,
providing the existence of a fixed point and thereby an equilibrium.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof proceeds inductively. Theorem (1) establishes that that profitability for
firm n implies that
∑
θ pn(θ)e
θ
k > 1; a monopolist has pn = p0.
Let pˆNm be the belief function for firm m of N firms as defined in (1.9), and let
AˆNm : ∆Θ→ [0, 1]|Θ| be firm m of N ’s optimal acceptance probability function, given
by Theorem 1, so that AˆNm ◦ pˆNm is firm m’s best response function in the N -firm game.
Let AˆN ◦ pˆN be the N -firm best response function, so that an equilibrium corresponds
to a fixed point of the function. For each N ∈ N such a fixed point is guaranteed to
exist by Theorem 2.
Suppose, for induction, that every fixed point of AˆN ◦ pˆN has ∀θ, n, An(θ) > 0 and
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therefore positive expected profits by Theorem 1. Recall that if in equilibriumAn(θ) >
0, firm n gets a strictly positive payoff. Assume, for contradiction, an equilibrium
given by (An, pn)n≤N+1 in the market with N +1 firms where firm N +1 gets a payoff
of 0. Therefore (An)n≤N+1 is a fixed point of AˆN+1◦ pˆN+1 and ∀θ, AN+1(θ) = 0. Thus,
using (1.9), for each firm m ≤ N + 1, pˆN+1m ((An)n≤N+1) = pˆNm((An)n≤N). Therefore,
as AˆNn = Aˆ
N+1
n , (An)n≤N is a fixed point of Aˆ
N ◦ pˆN . As by the inductive hypothesis
every such fixed point has ∀θ ∈ Θ,∀n ≤ N,An(θ) > 0, each firm n ≤ N is getting a
strictly positive payoff in the N + 1 firm equilibrium as well.
What remains to be shown is that firm N + 1 has a profitable deviation. As each
firm n ≤ N gets a positive payoff, from Theorem (1),
∑
θ∈Θ
pn(θ)e
θ
k > 1 (A.3)
and An, the acceptance probability vector for n, if not identically 1, is given by
An(θ)
1− An(θ) =
A¯n
1− A¯n e
θ
k (A.4)
A¯n =
∑
θ∈Θ
pn(θ)An(θ). (A.5)
Combining the above, and manipulating, we get
A¯n =
∑
θ∈Θ
pn(θ)
A¯n
1−A¯n e
θ
k
1 + A¯n
1−A¯n e
θ
k
(A.6)
1 =
∑
θ∈Θ
pn(θ)e
θ
k
1− A¯n + A¯ne θk
(A.7)
The distribution of types rejected by firm n ≤ N , qn, is given by:
qn(θ) =
pn(θ)(1− An(θ))∑
θ′∈Θ pn(θ
′)(1− An(θ′)) =
pn(θ)(1− An(θ))
1− A¯n . (A.8)
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Substituting for An(θ) from (A.4) we get
qn(θ) =
pn(θ)(
1 + A¯n
1−A¯n e
θ
k
)
(1− A¯n)
=
pn(θ)
1− A¯n + A¯ne θk
(A.9)
and using (A.7) we have
∑
θ∈Θ
qn(θ)e
θ
k =
∑
θ∈Θ
pn(θ)e
θ
k
1− A¯n + A¯ne θk
= 1 (A.10)
As AN+1 is identically 0 by hypothesis, the distribution of rejected types for n ≤
N + 1 is independent of whether the applicant has visited n. Therefore, we can write
the type distribution of applicants visiting firm N + 1, pN+1 as a weighted sum of the
distribution of rejected applicants at firms n ≤ N and the new applicant distribution
p0:
pN+1(θ) =
∑
n≤N
φnqn(θ) + (1−
∑
n≤N
φn)p0(θ) (A.11)
where φn is the probability an applicant visited firm n last before visiting firm N + 1,
conditional on firm N + 1 being visited. If a firm sets A¯n = 1, it has no rejected
applicants and thus for that n, φn = 0. The remaining probability 1 −
∑
n≤N φn, is
the probability (conditional on N + 1 being visited) that firm N + 1 is the first firm
visited; note 1−∑n≤N φn ≥ 1N+1 . Then,∑
θ∈Θ
pN+1(θ)e
θ
k =
∑
n≤N
φn
∑
θ∈Θ
qn(θ)e
θ
k + (1−
∑
n≤N
φn)
∑
θ∈Θ
p0(θ)e
θ
k (A.12)
so that substituting (A.8) we get
∑
θ∈Θ
pN+1(θ)e
θ
k =
∑
n≤N
φn
∑
θ∈Θ
qn(θ)e
θ
k + (1−
∑
n≤N
φn)
∑
θ∈Θ
p0(θ)e
θ
k (A.13)
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and using (A.10) we attain
∑
θ∈Θ
pN+1(θ)e
θ
k =
∑
n≤N
φn + (1−
∑
n≤N
φn)
∑
θ∈Θ
p0(θ)e
θ
k . (A.14)
Now, since by hypothesis
∑
θ∈Θ p0(θ)e
θ
k > 1, we have that
∑
θ∈Θ
pN+1(θ)e
θ
k > 1 (A.15)
but this is the condition under which Theorem 1 guarantees firm N + 1 a positive
payoff, a contradiction. Therefore, all firms in the N + 1 firm market get positive
payoff. By PMI, this holds for all N ∈ N, and the theorem is proven.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 5
First, suppose the payoff to becoming informed at the prior Π =
∑
θ>0 p0(θ)θ +
k
∑
θ∈Θ p0(θ) ln p0(θ) is weakly negative. Then no firm (even a monopolist) can ever
profit and N¯ = 0 trivially satisfies both sides. The rest of the proof assumes that the
monopolist would make strictly positive profits..
Firms always reject known θ < 0, and by hypothesis k
∑
θ∈Θ p0(θ) ln p0(θ) >∑
θ<0 θp0(θ) so that acceptance without information is not optimal; therefore, no
θ < 0 is ever accepted. Thus, we can write the equilibrium posterior for firm n as
a function of x, the total probability that a θ > 0 applicant was not accepted at a
previous firm:
pn(θ) =

xp0(θ)
x
∑
θ>0 p0(θ)+
∑
θ<0 p0(θ)
θ > 0
p0(θ)
x
∑
θ>0 p0(θ)+
∑
θ<0 p0(θ)
θ < 0.
(A.16)
The payoff to becoming informed by choosing gall (and accepting θ > 0) at pn is
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x
∑
θ>0
θp0(θ)− kH(pn(θ)) (A.17)
so that substituting in (A.16) and manipulating, we get
Π(x) =
[
x
∑
θ>0
p0(θ) +
∑
θ<0
p0(θ)
]−1
·[
x
∑
θ>0
p0(θ)θ + xk
∑
θ>0
p0(θ) (lnx+ ln p0(θ)) + k
∑
θ<0
p0(θ) ln p0(θ)
]
−k ln
(
x
∑
θ>0
p0(θ) +
∑
θ<0
p0(θ)
)
.
Notice Π(0) ≤ 0 and that, as x = 1 corresponds to the prior and it is assumed
that
∑
θ>0 p0(θ)θ +
∑
θ∈Θ p0(θ) ln p0(θ) > 0, we have Π(1) > 0. Now, consider the
derivative of the payoff to becoming informed wrt x:
Π′(x) =
[(∑
θ<0
p0(θ)
)(∑
θ>0
p0(θ)(θ + k ln p0(θ))
)
−
(∑
θ>0
p0(θ)
)(∑
θ<0
p0(θ)k ln p0(θ)
)
+k lnx · (
∑
θ>0
p0(θ))(
∑
θ<0
(p0θ))
][
x
∑
θ>0
p0(θ) +
∑
θ<0
p0(θ)
]−2
As Π′(x) limits to −∞ as x→ 0 from the right, as it has at most a single root in x,
given that Π(0) ≤ 0 and Π(1) > 0, the payoff to becoming informed has a single root
in (0, 1), at a point I denote x¯.
Set N¯ = 1
x¯
. For (a), suppose there are N < N¯ firms in the market. Then, from
the proof of Theorem 3, for θ < 0, Am(θ) = 0 and for θ > 0, Am(θ) = zm. Beliefs
for firm n are given therefore given by (A.16) where x ≥ 1
N
(the value taken when
all other firms set zm = 1). Therefore from
1
N
> 1
N¯
= x¯, we have Π( 1
N
) > 0 and thus
firm n must necessarily profit.
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For (b), suppose there are N > N¯ firms getting positive payoff in an equilibrium.
A firm making a profit uses a strategy with zm = 1 (due to non-indifference) so
that the equilibrium beliefs of firm n are given by (A.16) where x ≤ 1
N
< 1
N¯
= x¯.
Therefore, Π( 1
N
) < 0, so that firm n cannot get a positive profit, a contradiction.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality, take a realization x of Xt, written as x : R+ → ∆Θ and
denote its stopping time by τ . Supposing x is continuous, and since τ = inf{t|t ∈
S(t)}, x(0) = pn ∈ ∆Θ \ S(0) and S is closed-graph, we have τ 6= 0. As ∀t,S(0) ⊆
S(t), the image under x of [0, τ) satisfies x([0, τ)) ⊆ ∆Θ\S(0). If x is continuous, the
image under x of a set’s closure is contained in the closure of its image; ∆Θ \ S(0) ⊇
x([0, τ)) = x([0, τ ]). Thus, as the realized path x is almost surely continuous, xτ ∈
∆Θ \ S(0) almost surely.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6
Let an : ∆Θ → [0, 1] denote acceptance probability for each posterior once the pro-
cess X has stopped. Let AˆNn : ∆Θ → [0, 1]|Θ| be the function mapping initial beliefs
pn for firm n of N into an ex-ante vector of type-specific acceptance probabilities.
Additionally use pˆNn as given by (1.9), the belief function for player n of N , to map
opponents’ acceptance probabilities into beliefs for firm n. Write the N -firm accep-
tance probability function as AˆN : (∆Θ)N → [0, 1]|Θ|N and the N -firm belief function
as pˆN : [0, 1]|Θ|N → (∆Θ)N ; an equilibrium for N firms then corresponds to each fixed
point of AˆN ◦ pˆN .
For each firm n, if pn ∈ ∆Θ \ S(0), write as qn the average over Xt’s paths
posterior distribution for rejected applicants. As from Lemma (1) each posterior is
almost surely in ∆Θ \ S(0) and that set is convex as the closure of a convex set,
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qn ∈ ∆Θ \ S(0).
The proof will proceed with induction on the number of firms. With 1 firm in
the market, its beliefs are p1 = p0 ∈ ∆Θ \ S(0) so the firm will get a positive payoff.
Assume for induction that every equilibrium with N firms gives positive payoff to
every firm; that is, ∀n ≤ N, pn ∈ ∆Θ \ S(0) or An identically 1.
Assume for contradiction that in some equilibrium described by (An)n≤N+1 of
the market with N + 1 firms, firm N + 1 gets weakly negative expected payoff.
By equilibrium, AˆN+1 ◦ pˆN+1((An)n≤N+1) = (An)n≤N+1. As AN+1 is identically 0,
pˆN+1((An)n≤N+1) = pˆN+1((An)n≤N ,~0). Using (1.9), we have pˆN+1((An)n≤N ,~0) =
(pˆN(ANn )n≤N , pN+1) for some pN+1; so (An)n≤N is a fixed point of Aˆ
N◦pˆN and therefore
defines beliefs in an N firm equilibrium.
From the inductive hypothesis, in each such N -firm equilibrium, each firm n ≤ N
is getting a strictly positive expected payoff. Thus for each firm n either An is
identically 1 or pn ∈ ∆Θ \ S(0) and therefore Lemma (1) applies to each n ≤ N .
Then, firm N + 1 is either receiving an applicant last rejected by firm n where An is
not identically 1, or an applicant that has never visited another firm. Therefore
pN+1 =
∑
n≤N :A¯n 6=1
φnqn(θ) +
1− ∑
n≤N :A¯n 6=1
φn
 p0(θ) (A.18)
for some probability weights φ, where
∑
n≤N :A¯n 6=1 φn ≤ N/(N + 1). As p0 6∈ S(0) and
S(0) closed, p0 ∈ int(∆Θ \ S(0)).
But as Lemma (1) gives that qn ∈ ∆Θ \ S(0), as p0 ∈ int(∆Θ\S(0)) and ∆Θ\S(0)
is convex,
pN+1 ∈ ∆Θ \ S(0) (A.19)
and therefore firm N + 1 gets a strictly positive payoff, a contradiction. Thus, by
PMI, for any N ∈ N, in every equilibrium of the market with N firms, each firm gets
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strictly positive profit, proving the theorem.
91
Appendix B
Proofs of results in Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider an equilibrium match that has just been revealed to be good at t. For
revelation to have just occurred, the currently active offer involves monitoring.
If renegotiation occurs as per case 2 in Section 2.3.4 the proposer will receive
q/
(
r
(
1 + e−r∆
))
. The payoff to triggering renegotiations is obtained by discounting
this by e−r∆.
Assume that renegotiation never occurs in equilibrium; then the current monitor-
ing offer persists forever, yielding a total surplus of q−b
r
. Assuming that neither player
wants to reopen negotiations, if the current wage in place is w, we must have that
min{w
r
,
q − b− w
r
} ≥ 1
1 + e−r∆
q
r
For any current wage w, the greatest
min{w/r , (q − b− w) /r} can be is (q − b) /(2r); thus for renegotiation to never
occur we require that (q − b) /(2r) ≥ q/ (r (1 + e−r∆))⇔ (1 + e−r∆)b < (1− e−r∆)q,
which is ruled out by (C2).
But as one’s opponent reopening negotiations gives the receiver’s share of the new
bargain,
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e−r∆qe−r∆/
(
1 + e−r∆
)
, it becomes even harder to satisfy the requirement to not rene-
gotiate instantly with probability 1 if one’s opponent may trigger renegotiation; there-
fore both instantly triggering renegotiation is the only equilibrium. As this means
that each player has a probability 1/2 of being first proposer following revelation,
each player at the instant of revelation has an expected payoff of
1
2
· qe
−r∆
1 + e−r∆
+
1
2
· e−r∆ qe
−r∆
1 + e−r∆
=
qe−r∆
2
. 
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Define the quantities
ξ Flow mass of workers born per unit time
A Mass of unemployed black type α workers
B Mass of unemployed black type β workers
Λ Mass of currently monitored black type β workers
As g is the fraction of new workers that is type α and unemployed α workers are
becoming employed each at a Poisson rate µ and never separate, A obeys
dA
dt
= ξg − µA
Similarly, a proportion (1 − g) of new workers is type β and such unemployed
workers are also being hired at a Poisson rate µ each. However, as Λ workers who are
of type β are being monitored, a flow mass Λλ(1−β) of black β workers are separating
after monitoring reveals a bad match are also coming in to the black unemployed pool.
Hence, B obeys
dB
dt
= ξ(1− g)− µB + Λλ(1− β)
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.
Finally, unemployed β workers are becoming employed with monitoring at a Pois-
son rate µ and once they are employed they cease being monitored when match quality
is revealed, which occurs at a rate λ. Thus the mass of monitored black β workers Λ
must satisfy
dΛ
dt
= µB − Λλ
Steady state implies that
dA
dt
=
dB
dt
=
dΛ
dt
= 0
Solving, we obtain
A =
ξg
µ
B =
ξ(1− g)
µβ
and therefore the proportion of α workers in the unemployed pool is
A
A+B
=
ξg
µ
ξg
µ
+ ξ(1−g)
µβ
=
g
g + 1
β
(1− g) .
Thus, a new match from the black job-seeker pool is of average quality
g
g + 1
β
(1− g) · 1 +
(
1− g
g + 1
β
(1− g)
)
· β = β
βg + (1− g) ≡ θB
As β < 1 this is less than θW .
B.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The equilibrium wage proposed is
wworkNθW =
1
1 + e−r∆
(q − λ(1− θW )c)
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if the worker proposes first and
wfirmNθW =
e−r∆
1 + e−r∆
(q − λ(1− θW )c)
if the firm proposes first. As there will be no revelation, these shares split the expected
output (using firm beliefs) equally. This equilibrium is supported by firm beliefs that
are invariant to all contingencies before revelation.
At a pre-revelation history where an off-path offer is on the table, or where one
is already in place, it is accepted/not renegotiated if it does not involve monitoring
and the wage w satisfies
wworkNθW ≥ w ≥ wfirmNθW
If this condition does not hold at the off-path history in question, then, if in nego-
tiations, the current proposer plays the equilibrium offer; otherwise, both players’
strategy is to instantly reopen negotiations; and when they do, the equilibrium offer
will be proposed.
At off-path histories where the match is revealed to be good, if the wage w satisfies
1
1+e−r∆ q ≥ w ≥ e
−r∆
1+e−r∆ q it stays in place; otherwise, play proceeds as in Lemma 2,
granting an expected qe−r∆/(2r) to each party.
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, off-path histories that led to the revelation of a bad
match lead to termination of the match.
A party who deviates before revelation can at most, therefore, transition from
the receiver’s share to the proposer’s share of the match surplus, as one’s opponent’s
strategy will not accept worse offers. Doing so, however, occasions a single delay,
which discounts the payoff from such a deviation to exactly the receiver’s payoff, which
is the least the deviator could have started with. Therefore, there is no deviation that
will strictly increase the agents’ payoff and the strategies described are mutual best
responses.
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To show that there is no S3-type deviation that proposes monitoring, it remains
to show that an α worker or a firm cannot propose a mutually beneficial monitoring
regime.
Lemma 2 pins down continuation payoffs from being in a match revealed to be
good. Thus, an α worker making an offer of wu with monitoring in place yields to
this worker, in the absence of renegotiation until match quality revelation,
VMα(wu) =
wu + λ
qe−r∆
2r
λ+ r
. (B.1)
The requirement for S3 is stated in terms of beliefs remaining constant, in this case
at θW . Thus, an employer accepting this offer expects a payoff of
FMθW (wu) =
q − b− (1− θW )λc− wu + λθW qe−r∆2r
λ+ r
. (B.2)
Summing (B.1) and (B.2), we get
q − b− (1− θW )λc+ λ(1 + θW ) qe−r∆2r
λ+ r
(B.3)
For such a deviation to violate S3 necessarily (B.3) has to be greater than equi-
librium payoffs; this can only be the case if
b
λ
< (1− θW )λc
r
− q(2− e
−r∆(1 + θW ))
2r
(B.4)
which is precluded by assumption (C4).
In the limit as ∆ ↓ 0, the equilibrium shares of the first proposer and receiver
equalize; the limiting wage is wNθW = .5q − .5(1− θW )λc.
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider strategies for the firm and each type of worker that may in principle involve
renegotiation and different monitoring for each type of worker. Call m˜α and m˜β the
expected discount at the point of match quality revelation for α and β workers given
these strategies and let W˜α and W˜β be the total expected discounted wages before
such revelation occurs.
Equilibrium requires incentive compatibility: each worker weakly prefers the strat-
egy they actually adopt to the other type’s; hence, α’s IC requires
V˜α = W˜α + m˜α
qe−r∆
2r
≥ W˜β + m˜β qe
−r∆
2r
(B.5)
and the β’s IC imposes
V˜β = W˜β + m˜β
(
β
qe−r∆
2r
+ (1− β)Uβ
)
≥ W˜α + m˜α
(
β
qe−r∆
2r
+ (1− β)Uβ
)
(B.6)
Combining the two and rearranging terms
(m˜β − m˜α) (1− β)
(
Uβ − qe
−r∆
2r
)
≥(
W˜α + m˜α
qe−r∆
2r
)
−
(
W˜β + m˜β
qe−r∆
2r
)
≥ 0 (B.7)
Since from (C3) Uβ < qe
−r∆/2r, we have that m˜α ≥ m˜β.
The firm’s payoff in any such equilibrium given (W˜α, m˜α, W˜β, m˜β) is
1
1Here it is revelant to point out that if the expected discount on revelation is m, then the expected
cost of monitoring until revelation is mb/λ. This is for the following reason: to say the expected
discount on revelation is m is to say that for probability M(t) of monitoring at time t conditional
on no revelation by t,
∫∞
0
e−rte−
∫ t
0
λM(t′)dt′λM(t)dt = m; but the amount spent on monitoring
at each time is the probability no revelation occurs until that time multiplied by the probability
monitoring occurs at that time, the discount and the flow cost of monitoring; hence the total cost is∫∞
0
e−rte−
∫ t
0
λM(t′)dt′bM(t)dt = mb/λ.
97
F˜ = g
(q
r
(1− m˜α)− W˜α + m˜α qe
−r∆
2r
− m˜α b
λ
)
+ (B.8)
(1− g)
(q − (1− β)λc
r
(1− m˜β)− W˜β + m˜ββ qe
−r∆
2r
− m˜β b
λ
)
S3 requires that deviating first offers cannot be made that improve the payoff of
an α worker and the firm. As the wage can transfer surplus freely, this implies that
the sum of candidate equilibrium payoffs are weakly greater than the sum of those
feasible by a no-monitoring offer2:
V˜α + F˜ ≥ q − (1− θW )λc
r
(B.9)
Expanding,
V˜α + F˜ = (1− g)(W˜α − W˜β) + m˜α((1 + g)qe−r∆ − gb
λ
− gq
r
)
+m˜β(1− g)(−q − (1− β)λc
r
+
βqe−r∆
2r
− b
λ
) (B.10)
Retrieving
W˜α − W˜β ≤ (m˜β − m˜α)
(
β
qe−r∆
2r
+ (1− β)Uβ
)
by rearranging (B.6), we substitute it into (B.10) we arrive at an expression weakly
greater than the LHS of (B.9) where the coefficient of m˜β is
(1− g)1
r
[λc(1− β)− q(1− e−r∆β) + r(1− β)Uβ − rb
λ
] (B.11)
which we know from (C6) is positive. Therefore, up to the constraint imposed by
(B.5) we have an upper bound of the LHS of (B.9) increasing in m˜β. So if (B.9) holds
2Notice that while the candidate equilibrium is allowed to generate value from screening worker
types by strategies and therefore apply monitoring more efficiently, the deviations S3 checks against
are not. That it turns out such deviations are enough to destroy all equilibria but one is a product
of the β workers’ incentives to not reveal themselves.
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for some (m˜α, m˜β), it must hold for (m˜α, m˜α). Making this substitution, we arrive at
q − (1− θW )λc
r
(1− m˜α) + m˜α (1 + θW )qe
−r∆
2r
− m˜α b
λ
≥ q − (1− θW )λc
r
(B.12)
which due to (C4) can only occur if m˜α = 0.
Therefore, regardless of the first proposer, all equilibria in the white labor market
lack monitoring for both types of workers. We can further exclude equilibria with
delay, as an S3-type deviation giving the receiver his equilibrium utility and the
proposer taking the excess would be payoff-increasing in those cases.
Finally, by S3, no deviation by a first receiver that gives the first proposer his
payoff when proposing, discounted, is gainful. Therefore, the first proposer’s share
cannot be greater than 1
1+e−r∆ . Similarly, the initial proposer i cannot be getting
x < 1
1+e−r∆ , lest j have a deviating offer in his own role as first proposer giving i his
discounted value, e−r∆x and j a share of 1− xe−r∆ > 1
1+e−r∆ .
Thus, all equilibria of the white labor market reach immediate agreement with
a no-monitoring offer; the wage splits the surplus along the Rubinstein shares and
therefore the equilibrium of Proposition 1 is essentially (up to off-path behavior and
beliefs) unique.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The initial equilibrium wage proposed is
wworkMθB = [q − b− λ(1− θB)− (e−r∆ − θB)qe−r∆/ (2r)]/
(
1 + e−r∆
)
if the worker proposes first and
wfirmMθB = [e
−r∆(q − b− λ(1− θB))− (1− e−r∆θB)qe−r∆/ (2r)]/
(
1 + e−r∆
)
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if the firm proposes first. Monitoring is in use until revelation, and no renegotiation
takes place until then.
If the worker rejects a firm monitoring with a wage in [wfirmMθB , w
work
MθB
], opens rene-
gotiation when a monitoring regime with a wage in that interval is in place, or makes
or accepts a non-monitoring offer before revelation, the firm immediately believes the
worker to be type β. This change is irreversible. Otherwise, the firm has beliefs
constant at θB.
When the firm starts believing the worker to be type β, both parties immediately
renegotiate to the equilibrium in Section 2.3.4.4 with monitoring and a lower wage.
As long as beliefs are θB, agents in the role of proposer offer their w
i
MθB
. Moni-
toring offers with wages in [wfirmMθB , w
work
MθB
] wages are accepted by either party without
renegotiation until revelation. Other offers are rejected or renegotiated, and the next
offer is the proposer’s wiMθB .
If revelation occurs, bad matches separate; good matches renegotiate as per Lemma
1.
Clearly, workers don’t want to deviate to propose in [wfirmMθB , w
work
MθB
) as they will lead
to acceptance but a lower payoff; also, they don’t propose wages outside [wfirmMθB , w
work
MθB
]
as the firm will reject and propose wfirmMθB in addition to suffering the delay. Thus,
always proposing wworkMθB is optimal. Workers won’t reject offers in [w
firm
MθB
, wworkMθB ] or
accept or propose non-monitoring offers as they don’t want to be treated as βs as per
(C6) and (C7).
Firms know that by the workers’ strategy, the highest offer they can get ac-
cepted is wfirmMθB and that higher ones, or ones below w
work
MθB
, will be rejected and that
the worker will counter-offer wworkMθB , in addition to the firm suffering a delay. Firm
offers in (wfirmMθB , w
work
MθB
] will be accepted but yield a lower payoff than wfirmMθB ; thus
always proposing wfirmMθB is optimal for the firm. Given this, the firm accepts offers in
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[wfirmMθB , w
work
MθB
]; but will reject higher ones because it can do better as proposer, and
lower ones because it knows renegotiation will be imminent once they are in place. If
production is occurring, the firm can gain by renegotiating if either (a) the worker will
instantly renegotiate, and the firm’s first offer here is a lower wage than the worker’s
(so as above, if w < wfirmMθB ), or if the firm’s payoff from making its offer, w
firm
MθB
, with
delay, is preferable to the current payoff; but that is precisely when the current wage
w > wfirmMθB .
That there is no S3-type deviation that proposes no monitoring follows from (C4).
In the limit as ∆ ↓ 0, the equilibrium shares of the first proposer and receiver
equalize; the limiting wage is wMθB =
1
2
[q − b− λc(1− θB)]− (1−θB)2 λ q2r .
B.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof here proceeds in the same fashion as that in B.4. Instead of comparing to
a no-monitoring deviating offer we compare to a monitoring offer; therefore instead
of B.12 we have
q − (1− θB)λc
r
(1− m˜) + m˜(1 + θB)qe
−r∆
2r
− m˜ b
λ
≥ q − (1− θB)λc− b+
(1+θB)qe
−r∆
2r
λ+ r
(B.13)
which due to (C5) can only be true if m˜ ≥ λ
λ+r
; but as m˜ is an expected discount
of a variable that at most arrives as a Poisson with rate λ, this constitutes an upper
bound to m˜ and corresponds to full monitoring and no delay.
Therefore, only fully monitoring equilibria exist in the black labor market. Within
such candidate equilibria, S3 would allow for deviation from any initial offer not
corresponding to that in Proposition 3, therefore that equilibrium is unique.
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Appendix C
Proofs of results in Chapter 3
C.1 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. Let σ be an SPNE of G∞(δ) with equilibrium payoff vector u(σ) = v 6∈ F res.
From (3.2) we have a player i such that vi < ri. Let σ¯i be a strategy for player i that
myopically best responds to σ−i in every period, that is,
σ¯i(h
t−1) ∈ BRi(σ−i(ht−1)) = arg max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai, σ−i(ht−1)).
Since σ was assumed to be an SPNE, the optimality of σi implies that the myopic
best response strategy must also give player i less than ri against the opponents’
strategies: ui(σ¯i, σ−i) ≤ ui(σi, σ−i) < ri. Therefore, by definition of ri in (3.1) it
follows that there is a period t such that the myopic best response gives player i less
than ri:
∃ht−1 ∈ H t−1 : max
ai∈Ai
gi(ai, σ−i(ht−1)) < ri = min
α∈Q
max
a∗i∈Ai
gi(α
∗
i ,α−i) (C.1)
This immediately means that there is no αi that gives (αi, σ−i(ht−1)) the myopic
indifference property. In other words, there is some player j who is not myopically
indifferent at ht−1, i.e. for some pair of actions
∃ aj, a′j ∈ supp(σj(ht−1)) such that gj(aj, σ(ht−1)) 6= gj(a′j, σ(ht−1)). (C.2)
There are two strategies for i starting at ht−1, denoted σj |ht−1 and σ′j |ht−1 such that
one plays aj and the other a
′
j at the starting history h
t−1; since j plays both aj and
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a′j with positive probability, we must have
uj(σj |ht−1 , σ−j |ht−1) = uj(σ′j |ht−1 , σ−j |ht−1). (C.3)
Thus their induced player-j expected stage-game payoff sequences g
(τ)
j and g
′(τ)
j satisfy
(1− δj)
∑
τ≥t
δτ−tj g
(τ)
j = (1− δj)
∑
τ≥t
δτ−tj g
′(τ)
j (C.4)
and therefore ∑
τ≥t
δτ−tj (g
(τ)
j − g′(τ)j ) = 0. (C.5)
If σ is an equilibrium strategy profile for a discount factor δ′ it must be the case that
∑
τ≥t
δ′τ−tj (g
(τ)
j − g′(τ)j ) = 0. (C.6)
Regarded as a function of δ′j,
f(δ′j) ≡
∑
τ≥t
δ′τ−ti (g
(τ)
j − g′(τ)j ) (C.7)
is a power series with bounded coefficients (as F is compact). As such, it converges
absolutely for δ′j ∈ (0, 1). A well-known result from complex analysis asserts that a
power series either
1. has finitely many roots in any compact subset of the interior of its disk of
convergence; or
2. has all coefficients equal to 0.1
As (C.2) implies that gtj 6= g′tj , the coefficient on δ′0j is not 0, ruling out (2). But then
(1) is true, implying that there are only finitely many roots of f in [1
2
δj,
1
2
(1 + δj)]
and so (C.6) will not hold for all points of any neighborhood of δj. Therefore there
can be no neighborhood of δ on which σ is an SPNE, so that σ cannot be a DRSP
equilibrium strategy profile.
1This is a corollary of the fact that a non-constant analytic function’s zeros are isolated (the set
of roots is totally disconnected). A function defined by a power series is analytic on the interior of
its radius of convergence.
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C.2 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. Fix v ∈ F res\∂F res, where ∂F res is the lower boundary of the set.2 Pick
v′ ∈ F ∗ and  > 0 s.t.
∀i, ri < v′i < v′i + ε < vi. (C.8)
For each i define a vector vi giving each j 6= i a ‘reward’ of ε:
vij =
{
v′i j = i
v′j + ε ∀j 6= i.
Let αi ∈ Q be such that player i could earn her restricted minmax if she were to play
a best response to the action of the other players; that is,
αi ∈ arg min
α∈Q
max
ai
gi(ai, α−i) (C.9)
Choose N ∈ N s.t.
∀i, max
a∈A
gi(a) +N gi(α
i) < min
a∈A
gi(a) +Nv
′
i (C.10)
which is possible by inequality (C.8).
Strategies.
We construct a Simple Strategy Profile a la Abreu (1988): If j deviates at any point
unilaterally then impose Phase II(j) followed by Phase III(j).
Phase I : In each period play the correlated action p ∈ 4A such that v = ∑a∈A p(a)g(a).
Phase II(i): Play αi for N periods.
Phase III(i): Play pi ∈ 4A such that vi = ∑a∈A pi(a)g(a) at each period.
Note that the strategy, including parameters in it, is set independently of the
discount factor(s).3 Also note that we do not ask a player to best respond during her
own punishment phase, as that would not leave the others willing to mix.
Checking subgame perfection.
Step 1. Player i does not deviate from Phase I if
(1− δ) max
a∈A
gi(a) + δ[(1− δN)ri + δNv′i] ≤ (1− δ) min
a∈A
gi(a) + δvi. (C.11)
2The boundary condition is common to FM. Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1991) showed that exclu-
sion of the lower boundary may be dispensed with.
3In contrast, the third phase in FM depends on the exact discount factor when mixing is involved.
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As δ → 1, LHS → v′i and RHS → vi. In other words inequality (C.11) holds for
high δ because v′i < vi by (C.8).
Step 2. Player i does not deviate from Phase II(i) if
∀τ ∈ {1, ..., N}, (1− δτ )gi(αi) + δτv′i ≥ (1− δ)ri + δ[(1− δN)gi(αi) + δNv′i],
which as δ → 1 reduces to ri ≤ vi, which clearly holds with strict inequality; thus,
following Abreu, we see that restarting the minmax phase suffices to deter a deviation
by i.
Step 3. Player i does not deviate from Phase III(i) if
(1− δ) max
a∈A
gi(a) + δ[(1− δN) gi(αi) + δNv′i] ≤ (1− δ) min
a∈A
gi(a) + δv
′
i.
As δ → 1, both RHS & LHS → v′i. Hence we rearrange so that LHS −RHS =
= (1− δ){max
a∈A
gi(a)−min
a∈A
gi(a)}+ δ(1− δN)(gi(αi)− v′i)
= (1− δ){max
a∈A
gi(a)−min
a∈A
gi(a)}+ δ(1 + δ + . . .+ δN−1)(1− δ)(gi(αi)− v′i)
= (1− δ)
[
max
a∈A
gi(a)−min
a∈A
gi(a) + (δ + . . .+ δ
N)(gi(α
i)− v′i)
]
.
As δ → 1, the term in square brackets tends to
max
a∈A
gi(a)−min
a∈A
gi(a) +N(gi(α
i)− v′i) = (max
a∈A
gi(a) +Ngi(α
i))− (min
a∈A
gi(a) +Nv
′
i),
which is negative by inequality (C.10), implying that Phase III(i) is an equilibrium
strategy phase for large enough δ.
Step 4. Player i does not deviate (observably) from Phase II(j) or Phase III(j) because
as δ → 1 deviation payoff → v′i, whereas the equilibrium payoff → v′i + ε.
Step 5. Although player i does not deviate observably we need to show that she
mixes as required in Phase II(j). Recall our definition of Q; since αj ∈ Q, mixing
only occurs between myopically indifferent actions according to αj ; as future play
does not vary over i’s actions on supp(αji ), she is indifferent.
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